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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) 
completed their revision of Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (“U.C.C” or “Code”) and promulgated this newly revised 
uniform version for adoption by the states.  To date, only the 
Territory of the Virgin Islands has adopted the new uniform version 
of Article 1 in its entirety.1  Twenty-one state legislatures have 
introduced bills containing revised Article 1; however, none have 
adopted the new expanded choice-of-law provisions contained in 
revised section 1-301.  Alabama,2 Arkansas,3 Connecticut,4 Delaware,5 
Hawaii,6 Idaho,7 Minnesota,8 Montana,9 Nebraska,10 Nevada,11 New 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law.  J.D., University 
of Colorado School of Law 1994.  I would like to thank my research assistant, 
Kimberly Sharpe, for her extraordinary help in assembling the material for this 
Article.  I would also like to thank James A.R. Nafziger, the Thomas B. Stoel Professor 
of Law at Willamette University College of Law, and Michael S. Finch, Professor of 
Law at Stetson University College of Law, for their helpful comments on various 
drafts of this Article.  The views advanced herein are the Author’s alone. 
 1 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 11A, § 1-301 (2003).  Much of the information regarding 
introduction and adoption of legislation involving revised Article 1 was obtained 
from the NCCUSL website.  NCCUSL, Final Acts & Legislation, http://www.nccusl. 
org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=60 (select “UCC Article 1, 
General Provisions” from “Select an Act Title” drop-down menu; select desired state 
or territory from “Select a State” drop-down menu) (last visited Oct. 3, 2005); 
NCCUSL, A Few Facts About the Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 1, 
General Provisions (2001), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/ 
uniformacts-fs-ucc1.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
 2 ALA. CODE § 7-1-301 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004). 
 3 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-301 (Supp. 2005). 
 4 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 5-109 (adopting revisions to Article 1 of the U.C.C. 
to “conform Connecticut commercial law with recent changes in the uniform law”). 
 5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (1999 & Supp. 2005). 
 6 HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:1-301 (Supp. 2004). 
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Mexico,12 Oklahoma,13 Texas,14 and Virginia15 all adopted the 
majority of the revisions,16 but each retained the approach of former 
section 1-105 in lieu of revised section 1-301.  The legislatures of 
Arizona,17 Illinois,18 Kansas,19 Massachusetts,20 New Hampshire,21 
North Dakota,22 and West Virginia23 also introduced bills containing 
revised Article 1.  However, all except those in Illinois, Massachusetts, 
and New Hampshire died without adoption, and only the New 
Hampshire bill retains the uniform revised section 1-301.24
One of the primary controversies surrounding revised Article 1 
centers on section 1-301 and its greater deference to party autonomy 
to choose applicable law in non-consumer transactions.25  Simply 
stated, party autonomy measures the extent to which contracting 
parties may choose the substantive law to be applied by a tribunal 
charged with deciding the parties’ rights and duties under the 
contract and resolving disputes between the parties.26
Former section 1-105 limited party autonomy by limiting the 
parties’ choice to the law of a state or nation to which their 
 7 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-1-301 (Supp. 2004). 
 8 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-301 (West Supp. 2005). 
 9 MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-301 (2005). 
 10 Legis. B. 570, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005) (enacted) (to be codified at 
NEB. REV. STAT. (U.C.C.) § 1-301). 
 11 S. 201, 73d Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005) (enacted). 
 12 N.M. STAT. § 55-1-301 (Supp. 2005). 
 13 H.R. 2028, 50th Legis. Sess., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2005) (enacted) (to be codified at 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 1-301). 
 14 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301 (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005). 
 15 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-301 (Supp. 2005). 
 16 Aside from section 1-301, the only other provision that has not been uniformly 
adopted is revised section 1-201(20), which would broaden the definition of good 
faith under Article 1 to include “observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing” in all transactions within its scope.  See Keith A. Rowley, One For All, But 
None For (All of) One: Revised Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Part 2 of 2), 12 
NEV. LAW., Aug. 2004, at 28, 29 & n.27. 
 17 S. 1234, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005). 
 18 S. 1647, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2005). 
 19 H.R. 2453, 81st Leg. (Kan. 2005). 
 20 H.R. 91, 183d Gen. Court (Mass. 2003). 
 21 H.R. 719, 159th Gen. Court (N.H. 2005). 
 22 S. 2143, 59th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2005). 
 23 S. 254, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 2004). 
 24 See Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But Not Yet Duplicated, Revised Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 1, 9–12 (2005), http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rowley/RA1. 
070105.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).  The New Hampshire bill also appears likely to 
die without enactment.  Id. at 12. 
 25 See id. at 5–6, 11–12. 
 26 See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.1 (4th ed. 2004). 
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transaction bore a reasonable relationship.27  In contrast, revised 
section 1-301 would allow commercial parties to choose the law of any 
state (or, in an international transaction, any state or nation),28 
subject to a narrow exception where the parties’ choice would 
contravene a fundamental policy of the jurisdiction whose law would 
otherwise apply.29  Supporters have urged states to follow the lead of 
the ALI and NCCUSL and adopt the revised uniform provisions of 
section 1-301.30  However, these new provisions have generated 
substantial opposition from two very different perspectives.31
On one hand, some scholars have argued against section 1-301’s 
greater deference to the parties’ express choice of governing law for 
fear of mischief in the selection of the laws of a state to which the 
transaction bears no relationship.32  These opponents of expanded 
party autonomy suggest that, if the parties are granted complete 
autonomy, they may abuse it to deprive a state of its sovereign power 
to legislate for the benefit and protection of its citizenry.33  A choice-
of-law rule allowing for such a private attack on state sovereignty 
would be contrary to the rule of law and would, therefore, fail to pass 
constitutional muster under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.34  While 
consumer transactions are expressly excluded from the rules 
expanding party autonomy, opponents of such autonomy have 
nevertheless expressed concerns over unequal bargaining power in 
many transactions that do not involve consumers.35
On the other hand, many industry groups have opposed section 
1-301 because of its special deference to consumers and individual 
state laws designed to protect them—favoring, instead, broad party 
 27 See U.C.C. § 1-105 (superseded 2001). 
 28 See id. § 1-301(c) (2001). 
 29 See id. § 1-301(f) (2001). 
 30 Cf. generally Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Chair, Unif. Commercial 
Code Article 1 Drafting Comm., to Members of the Am. Law Inst. (May 10, 2001), 
http://www.ali.org/ali/2001_Reporters_M3.htm. 
 31 See sources cited infra notes 32–36. 
 32 See generally, e.g., William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative 
Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697 (2001); Richard K. Greenstein, 
Is the Proposed U.C.C. Choice of Law Provision Unconstitutional?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1159 
(2001). 
 33 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 701. 
 34 See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1181–83. 
 35 See Pamela Edwards, Into the Abyss: How Party Autonomy Supports Overreaching 
Through the Exercise of Unequal Bargaining Power, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 421, 455 
(2003); see also generally Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of 
Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295 (2005). 
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autonomy to choose controlling law in all transactions, including 
those involving consumers.36
Presumably, each of these sources of opposition has influenced 
the actions of the state legislatures that have considered section 1-301 
to date.  Thus far, no state has adopted either the expanded 
approach to party autonomy or the special deference to consumer 
protection laws reflected in the model law.  At this stage of the efforts 
to enact revised Article 1 as a whole, section 1-301 and its attempt to 
expand party autonomy to choose applicable law in non-consumer 
transactions must be deemed a rather dismal failure.37
With the likely demise of section 1-301 as a source of uniform 
law, it seems timely to revisit some of the issues raised in the debate 
over its enactment and consider possible alternatives for addressing 
the question of party autonomy in choice-of-law governing contracts 
between commercial parties other than consumers.38  In doing so, 
 36 See Letter from Daniel J. Popeo, Chairman and Gen. Counsel, and David A. 
Price, Senior Vice President, Legal Affairs, Wash. Legal Found., to K. King Burnett, 
President, Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, and Michael Traynor, 
President, Am. Law Inst. (May 9, 2003), http://www.ali.org/ali/WLFUCCcomments. 
pdf; Letter from Quentin Riegel, Vice President, Litig. & Deputy Gen. Counsel, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Mfrs., to Josephine Scarlett, Nat’l Telecomms. and Info. Admin. (Dec. 24, 
2002), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/frnotices/2002/esign/ucc/comments/ 
nam/nam.htm; National Association of Manufacturers, Industry Concerns About 
Final Article 2 Revisions, http://www.nam.org/s_nam/doc1.asp?CID=200173&DID= 
223242 (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
Inasmuch as this Article does not address consumer transactions, it does not 
expressly take any position with respect to the positions of these opponents of revised 
section 1-301. 
 37 U.C.C. § 1-301 is not the first uniform statute addressing choice of law to be 
rejected by state legislatures.  The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(“UCITA”), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2005), has also been rejected by every state to consider it, except 
Maryland and Virginia.  While the opposition to UCITA was not limited to its choice 
of law provision, this was certainly a focal point.  See infra note 79. 
 38 In this Article, I will focus solely on non-consumer transactions.  Much of the 
debate surrounding revised U.C.C. Article 1 and, more recently, revised U.C.C. 
Article 2, involves concerns with consumer transactions.  Legal reform in commercial 
law is arguably much more likely to the extent that consumer and non-consumer 
transactions are addressed separately.  See Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to 
Symposium on Proposed Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 787, 792 & n.25 (2001).  An 
excellent example of this separation is found in the United Nations Convention for 
the International Sale of Goods under Article 2(a).  United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 2(a), Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 
(1980) [hereinafter CISG] (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1988).  See also UNIDROIT 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, pmbl. cmt. 2 (2004) 
[hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES] (explaining that the restriction of the 
UNIDROIT Principles to commercial contracts is intended to exclude “consumer 
transactions” because they are “increasingly subjected to special rules, mostly of a 
mandatory character, aimed at protecting the consumer”). 
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this Article takes a comparative approach.39  This Article examines 
various critiques of expanded party autonomy in light of current 
realities of party autonomy in choice-of-law: (1) in arbitration, (2) 
under various state choice-of-law statutes addressing certain 
categories of contracts, and (3) under various foreign and 
international approaches to choice-of-law.  Based on the conclusions 
arising out of this examination, this Article proposes a uniform 
choice-of-law statute governing commercial contracts generally40 and 
granting even greater party autonomy in non-consumer transactions 
than does revised section 1-301.41  This Article suggests that 
commercial parties should be allowed to choose any body of law to 
govern their transaction,42 subject only to minimal requirements in 
the case of form contracts to ensure actual consent43 and a narrow 
Thus, I discuss and attempt to address the arguments opposing the expansion of 
party autonomy reflected in section 1-301.  However, I will not directly address any 
issues regarding choice-of-law in consumer transactions.  Nor will I address issues 
relating to choice-of-law in employment contracts.  See PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 139, 143–50 (1999) (suggesting the need to consider 
special protections when addressing choice-of-law in consumer and employment 
contracts).  To the extent that any of my analysis may bear on issues arising in 
consumer or employment contracts, this is entirely incidental to the focus of this 
Article, as the model statute proposed in Part VI would not apply to either. 
 39 See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need For a Comparative Approach to Choice-
of-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309 (1999) [hereinafter Juenger, Need For a 
Comparative Approach]. 
 40 U.C.C. § 1-301 would only apply to transactions otherwise governed by another 
article of the Code, U.C.C. § 1-301(b) (2001), but not governed by a more specific 
choice of law provision in that article, see id. § 1-301(g) (2001).  See also id. § 1-102 
(2001) (limiting the scope of Article 1 to transactions otherwise governed by the 
Code). 
 41 While significantly expanding deference to party autonomy, section 1-301 
retains significant limits on the parties’ right to choose foreign, international, or a-
national law.  See infra Part II.C. 
 42 As more fully explained infra, I propose the elimination of other additional 
limits contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971) (expressly limiting the parties to 
“state” law, as opposed to a-national law); id. § 187(2)(a) (1971) (declining to 
enforce the parties’ choice if the chosen state: (1) “has no substantial relationship to 
the parties or transaction,” and (2) “there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ 
choice”); id. § 187 cmt. d (1971) (limiting the parties right to choose their own law to 
circumstances in which two or more states have an interest in the transaction), and 
revised Article 1 of the U.C.C., see U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(1) (2001) (limiting parties to a 
domestic transaction to choice of domestic state law); id. § 1-301(c)(1) and (2) 
(2001) (expressly limiting the parties to the law of a “state” or “country,” as opposed 
to a-national law).  But see id. § 1-301 cmt. 2 (2001) (discussing the possible 
application of a-national law under section 1-302). 
 43 See infra Part VI.B.2. 
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exception where the parties’ choice would directly contravene a 
fundamental public policy of a relevant state.44
This Article’s most obvious claim is that such a statute will 
increase predictability and efficiency in commercial dispute 
resolution, consistent with the intentions of the parties.  This Article’s 
less obvious but perhaps more significant claims, in light of actual 
current and likely future realities in commercial dispute resolution, 
are that: (1) state sovereignty is actually better served by granting 
increased party autonomy as proposed here; and (2) such a statute 
would satisfy any constitutional requirements. 
Part II of this Article frames the issues and explains the 
importance of expanded party autonomy in choice of governing 
contract law.  While all or most state choice-of-law regimes will 
enforce the parties’ express choice between the laws of any state or 
nation to which the transaction bears a “reasonable relation,” many 
will not enforce an express choice of any other body of law.  Part II 
then describes a variety of circumstances giving rise to sound 
commercial reasons why parties might indeed wish to select a body of 
law other than that of a jurisdiction to which the transaction bears a 
relationship. 
Part III compares the level of party autonomy in choice-of-law, as 
applied in arbitration versus court proceedings in the United States.  
French comparativist René David noted over thirty years ago that 
parties could, and frequently did, avoid court imposed limits on party 
autonomy in choice-of-law by simply choosing arbitration.45  More 
recently, the late Friedrich K. Juenger pointed out the need for a 
comparative approach to choice-of-law problems, seemingly inviting 
such a comparison.46  Part III also explores the differences between 
treatment of the parties’ choice of governing law in arbitration and 
court adjudication, and then asks whether these differences are 
desirable, or whether either or both should be modified so as to 
make each more consistent with the other. 
 44 As more fully explained infra, I suggest a fundamental public policy exception 
similar to that contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(b) 
(1971), and revised section 1-301(f) of the U.C.C., and also commonly found in 
international law.  See infra Part VI.B.1.  This Article does not intend to suggest that 
such an exception to party autonomy is novel, but rather that such a narrow 
exception provides the most effective means of avoiding unreasonable infringement 
on state sovereignty while maximizing party choice. 
 45 René David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 212, Note 5802 (1973).  See also Friedrich K. 
Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 1133, 1133–
34 (2000) [hereinafter Juenger, Lex Mercatoria]. 
 46 See Juenger, Need For a Comparative Approach, supra note 39, at 1332. 
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Part IV compares various domestic state statutes—other than 
those contained in the U.C.C.—addressing party autonomy in choice 
of contract law.  These include both uniform statutes addressing 
narrow areas of application, as well as broad statutes, applying to 
contracts generally, but limited to only one or a small number of 
states.  As with choice-of-law in arbitration, these statutes present 
parties, in many circumstances, with an opportunity to circumvent 
other state choice-of-law statutes that may place greater restrictions 
on party autonomy.  Part IV also evaluates the relative merits of some 
of these statutes and attempts to draw from them in considering the 
outlines of a model domestic choice-of-law statute for contracts. 
Part V compares the level of party autonomy provided under a 
sampling of foreign and international choice-of-law regimes.  A survey 
of numerous foreign and international provisions addressing choice-
of-law in contracts shows that the apparently “controversial” 
expansion of party autonomy under revised section 1-301 does not 
even go as far in granting party autonomy as many current 
international and foreign choice-of-law regimes.  Part V explores 
these differences between choice-of-law rules for contracts in our 
domestic system and other legal systems, asks whether such 
differences are appropriate, and then asks what guidance they might 
provide in considering a model domestic choice-of-law statute for 
commercial contracts. 
Part VI begins by addressing the need for uniformity in 
contractual choice-of-law provisions and then proposes a model 
choice-of-law provision applicable to private non-consumer contracts, 
generally—and not limited to those otherwise governed by the U.C.C.  
Part VI concludes with a brief examination of the constitutionality of 
the proposed model statute under the Due Process and Full Faith 
and Credit Clauses. 
II. CHOICE OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 
Most legal analysis focuses on the application of substantive law 
to the facts of a dispute.  However, a dispute is often effectively 
decided by the choice of which substantive law governs the legal 
relationship.  Thus, in resolving a commercial dispute, the threshold 
question faced by a tribunal is the choice of substantive law governing 
the parties’ relationship.  In the absence of an express choice by the 
parties, the tribunal must make its own choice of appropriate law.47
 47 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 188 (1971). 
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When the entire transaction takes place in a single jurisdiction 
in which the tribunal and each party also resides, the choice is usually 
easy—the tribunal chooses the substantive law of that jurisdiction.48  
However, when the transaction bears a reasonable relationship to 
more than one jurisdiction, then the tribunal may have to make a 
choice between multiple, and sometimes conflicting, bodies of 
substantive law.  In making that choice, a tribunal engages in a 
conflict analysis to determine the appropriate substantive law.49
However, an agreement will sometimes include an express 
choice-of-law provision.  In that case, the tribunal faces a different 
threshold question—whether to respect and enforce the parties’ 
choice.50  While it is often said that American courts respect the 
parties’ autonomy to choose their own law of contract,51 that 
autonomy is, in fact, subject to significant limits.52
A. Choice of Law under the Uniform Commercial Code 
In domestic commercial transactions within the scope of the 
U.C.C., choice-of-law was historically governed by various state law 
enactments of former section 1-105.53  Section 1-105(1) provided that 
the parties’ choice should be respected if, and only if, the parties 
chose the law of a state to which the transaction bore a reasonable 
relation.54  Thus, a Florida seller and Georgia buyer of goods could 
effectively choose either Florida or Georgia law, but could not choose 
the law of New York (absent some relationship to New York).  A 
fortiori, the parties could not choose some other body of law not 
 48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). 
 49 See id. 
 50 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2.  One might reasonably argue that, “[i]n 
the absence of third party effects, the parties to the transaction should be permitted 
to choose the applicable law through contract,” and that such a choice by the parties 
should not be limited to any particular jurisdiction or even limited to sovereign law 
of any sort.  Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883, 
913–14 (2002).  However, the parties’ interest in party autonomy may not be the only 
interest considered by a court.  Even in the absence of third party effects, a court may 
also consider the interests of various sovereigns with an interest in the transaction, as 
well as systemic interests affected by choice-of-law rules.  Kathleen Patchel, Choice of 
Law and Software Licenses: A Framework for Discussion, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 117, 124–32 
(2000). 
 51 See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, §18.2; Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s 
Triumph?  Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 571, 576 (1999). 
 52 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, §18.2; Patchel, supra note 50, at 139–40 (noting 
limits contained in U.C.C. § 1-105 and the Rome Convention). 
 53 U.C.C. § 1-105 (superseded 2001). 
 54 Id. 
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adopted by any American state.  Notably, the parties could include 
specific stated variations from applicable law, under section  
1-102(3),55 but they were not allowed to select an entire body of law 
to replace the law of the relevant state or states.56
Section 1-301 of revised Article 1 was intended to replace former 
section 1-105 and expand available choices of law for non-consumer 
commercial parties.57  Section 1-301(c) provides separate rules for 
domestic transactions in subsection (1) and international 
transactions in subsection (2).58  Under section 1-301, parties to a 
domestic transaction may choose the law of any state—without regard 
to whether the transaction bears any relationship to that state59—and 
parties to an international transaction may choose the law of any state 
or any country.60  It is this expanded party autonomy in choice-of-law 
that has been rejected by each of the states enacting revised Article 1 
to date.61
From its inception, section 1-301 and its proposed expansion of 
party autonomy has been subject to significant criticism, as a radical 
and ill-conceived departure from existing choice-of-law doctrine.62  
Scholars have argued that such broad party autonomy represents a 
threat to state sovereignty,63 fails to distinguish between large and 
small business transactions,64 and violates the Full Faith and Credit 
 55 Id. § 1-102(3) (superseded 2001). 
 56 See id. § 1-105 (superseded 2001) (limiting parties’ ability to choose applicable 
law in certain areas). 
 57 See id. § 1-301 cmts. 1, 2 (2001). 
 58 Id. § 1-301(a), (c) (2001). 
 59 U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(1) (2001); Charles R. Keeton, Pending Revisions To The UCC 
Articles 1 and 2 as They Affect E-Commerce: Is The Sky Falling?, 743 PLI/PAT. 271, 324 
(2003). 
 60 U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(2) (2001); Keeton, supra note 59, at 324. 
 61 See supra Part I. 
 62 See, e.g., Memorandum from William J. Woodward, Jr. to Members of the Am. 
Law Inst. Re: Motion to Amend Proposed U.C.C. § 1-301 (May 7, 2001), http://www. 
ali.org/ali/2001Woodward_M1.htm [hereinafter Woodward Memo]; Memorandum 
from Jay L. Westbrook to Members of the Am. Law Inst. Re: Motion to Table  
Article 1 Proposals (May 7, 2001), http://www.ali.org/ali/2001Westerbrook_M1.htm 
[hereinafter Westbrook Memo]. 
 63 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 758–59 (suggesting that a market-centered 
approach to lawmaking is fundamentally at odds with traditional notions of state 
sovereignty). 
 64 See Edwards, supra note 35, at 455 (noting that individual consumers are often 
protected based on notions of inequalities in bargaining power, but suggesting the 
absence of such protections in the case of commercial parties lacking equal 
bargaining power); see also generally Garvin, supra note 35. 
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Clause of the United States Constitution.65  However, the 
extraordinary level of controversy surrounding section 1-301 seems 
quite remarkable considering the nature of limited changes 
proposed.  In examining the import of the changes proposed by 
section 1-301, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides a 
useful point of reference.66
The elimination of the “reasonable relation” requirement in 
section 1-301 appears quite consistent with the Restatement approach.67  
Under this approach, the parties’ choice of substantive contract law is 
to be given effect, irrespective of whether the transaction is 
reasonably related to the state whose law is chosen, as long as there 
exists a “reasonable basis” for the parties’ choice.68  While section  
1-301 does not include the latter limitation, it might to some extent 
be implied based on the duty of good faith imposed in all contracts.69  
Thus, it would seem that the elimination of the reasonable 
relationship requirement is consistent with existing law outside the 
scope of the U.C.C. 
The U.C.C. also includes choice-of-law provisions in Articles 4A, 
5, and 8, which allow contracting parties to choose governing law 
within the scope of those articles—without any requirement that the 
transaction bear a reasonable relationship to the designated law.70  
Thus, it does not appear that there is, necessarily, any reason to 
restrict party autonomy broadly within the U.C.C. as a whole. 
 65 See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1183 (arguing that complete respect for party 
autonomy amounts to the use of one jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rules to subvert the 
sovereignty of another). 
 66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2). 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. § 187(2)(a); see also Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Chair, Unif. 
Commercial Code Article 1 Drafting Comm.; Professor Neil B. Cohen, Reporter; and 
Professor Kathleen Patchel, Assoc. Reporter, to Members of the Am. Law Inst., Re: 
Motion of Professor Jay L. Westbrook Regarding Proposed Revision of Article 1 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, Part B (May 10, 2001), http://www.ali.org/ali/ 
2001_Reporters_M3.htm [hereinafter Auerbach Memo in Response to Westbrook] 
(explaining that the only real effect of the “reasonable basis” element of the test was 
to add an element of uncertainty to the parties’ transaction and, thereby, support the 
need for simplification of the issue under section 1-301). 
 69 See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001).  For example, the choice of a body of law written 
only in an obscure foreign language and chosen for purposes of making resolution 
of disputes under the agreement more difficult would seem to violate the duty of 
good faith in exercising the parties’ right to choose their own governing law under 
U.C.C. § 1-301.  Such a patently unreasonable choice in a transaction involving a sale 
or lease of goods might also be subject to challenge based on unconscionability.  See 
Id. §§ 2-302, 2A-108 (2003). 
 70 See id. §§ 4A-507(b), 5-116(a), 8-110(e). 
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Section 1-301 also adds an express “fundamental policy” 
limitation on party autonomy, wherein the parties’ choice of law 
would be ineffective to the extent inconsistent with a fundamental 
policy of the jurisdiction whose law would otherwise govern in the 
absence of an express choice by the parties.71  While such an 
exception might have been implied under former section 1-105,72 the 
express inclusion of the exception in revised section 1-301 further 
clarified the issue.73
The foregoing debate was fully aired during the ALI review 
process.74  In addition, proponents of revised section 1-301 pointed 
 71 See id. § 1-301(f) (2001); see also Auerbach Memo in Response to Westbrook, 
supra note 68, Part E (explaining that this provided for greater limits in party 
autonomy under section 1-301 in response to opposition to the elimination of the 
reasonable relation requirement). 
Section 1-301 does not address any potential effect of a fundamental policy of 
the forum state (where the forum state’s law would not otherwise govern the 
transaction, but for its status as the forum).  U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 9 (2001).  See 
discussion infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing further the issue of whether or not a 
fundamental policy of the forum should be relevant in deciding whether to enforce 
the parties’ choice of law). 
 72 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.12; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). 
 73 See Keeton, supra note 59, at 325. 
In view of the express inclusion of a fundamental policy exception in section  
1-301, the resistance of those opposed to UCITA, see infra Part II, would seem 
misplaced.  Many states opposing UCITA have enacted “bomb shelter” provisions, 
which purport to bar the application of UCITA to their citizens.  Woodward, supra 
note 32, at 781.  In a transaction between an Iowa licensee and a Virginia licensor 
choosing Virginia Law (UCITA), section 1-301 of the revised U.C.C. would give effect 
to the Iowa “bomb shelter,” while the language of former section 1-105 would not. 
 74 See, e.g., Woodward Memo, supra note 62; Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, 
Chair, Unif. Commercial Code Article 1 Drafting Comm.; Professor Neil B. Cohen, 
Reporter; and Professor Kathleen Patchel, Assoc. Reporter, to Members of the Am. 
Law Inst., Re: Motion of Professor William J. Woodward, Jr., Regarding Proposed 
Revision of Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code (May 10, 2001), http://www. 
ali.org/ali/2001_Reporters_M2.htm; Westbrook Memo, supra note 62; Auerbach 
Memo in Response to Westbrook, supra note 68.  Interestingly, both sides purported 
to support their arguments by reference to the same provisions of section 187 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.  This illustrates quite clearly the lack of 
predictability in resolving choice of law questions under the Restatement approach. 
Proponents of section 1-301 also suggested that parties have always had 
complete autonomy to choose controlling law, based on former section 1-102.  
Auerbach Memo in Response to Westbrook, supra note 68, Part C (suggesting that 
parties could choose the model UCITA to govern their transaction, even if they 
could not choose Virginia’s statutory enactment of that model law).  This argument 
proves too much.  If true, then the limitations of former section 1-105 are rendered 
null.  While former section 1-102 gives the parties the right to vary “the effects” of the 
U.C.C. by agreement, it does not suggest that the parties may simply substitute an 
entirely different body of law for the U.C.C. 
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out its extremely limited application within the scope of the U.C.C.75  
However, the scope of this limited application happened to coincide 
with the ongoing battle over the scope of Article 2 and the question 
of whether, and to what extent, it should govern computer 
information.  At least some of the current criticism of section 1-301 
can be attributed to the intense battle over the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”) and continuing concerns 
over its potential application to transactions involving computer 
software and related items.  In order to better understand the nature 
of this concern, a very brief history of UCITA is useful.76
B. The Legacy of UCITA 
UCITA grew out of the failed attempt of ALI and NCCUSL to 
promulgate a new Article 2B of the U.C.C. concerning transactions 
involving computer information and software.77  Its proponents 
believed that such transactions were not adequately dealt with under 
Article 2, because they were not actually “sales of goods,” but were 
instead mere licenses to use proprietary information or software.78  
This effort ultimately failed to gain the support of the ALI, largely 
because the provisions were seen as too one-sided in favor of industry 
and provided too little protection for licensees.79  NCCUSL then 
decided to promulgate that same body of law as UCITA—separate 
 75 See U.C.C. § 1-102 (2001); see also Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Chair, 
Unif. Commercial Code Article 1 Drafting Comm.; Professor Neil B. Cohen, 
Reporter; and Professor Kathleen Patchel, Assoc. Reporter, to Members of the Am. 
Law Inst., Re: Proposed U.C.C. Section 1-301 (May 10, 2001), http://www.ali.org/ 
ali/2001_Reporters_M1.htm. 
 76 For a more complete discussion of the history of UCITA and some of the issues 
that led to its rejection in the vast majority of jurisdictions, see Roger C. Bern, “Terms 
Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge 
Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 773–83 (2004). 
 77 John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. & 
COM. 1, 36–37 (2000); Gregory E. Maggs, The Waning Importance of Revisions to U.C.C. 
Article 2, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 620 (2003); Jerry T. Myers, An Overview of the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 106 COM. L.J. 275, 275–76 (2001). 
 78 Murray, supra note 77, at 36–37; Maggs, supra note 77, at 617–20; Myers, supra 
note 77, at 275–76. 
 79 Matthew J. Smith, Comment, An Overview of the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act: Warranties, Self-Help, and Contract Formation—Why UCITA Should Be 
Renamed “The Licensors’ Protection Act,” 25 SO. ILL. U. L.J. 389, 392–93 (2001).  Critics’ 
major concerns include: (1) the adoption of “layered” or “rolling” contract theory, 
id. at 394–400; see also Murray, supra note 77, at 36–37; (2) extraordinary “self help” 
remedies, Smith, supra, at 410–12; and (3) broad party autonomy in choice of 
substantive law and forum, id. at 407–09.  Arguably, the latter provision, granting 
broad party autonomy has provided substantial fuel for the opposition to U.C.C.  
§ 1-301.  See discussion infra Part II. 
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and apart from the U.C.C., but essentially governing the same body 
of transactions as intended under proposed Article 2B.80  This effort 
also largely failed, with only Virginia81 and Maryland82 adopting 
UCITA,83 and there seems to be little, if any, likelihood of further 
adoption in other states.84  Nonetheless, UCITA remains in force in 
Virginia and Maryland.85
Those opposing the adoption of section 1-301 of the U.C.C. fear 
that many businesses providing software and other information will 
include choice-of-law provisions in their contracts choosing Virginia 
or Maryland law, thus subjecting those transactions to UCITA—a 
body of law rejected by the vast majority of states.86  In fact, one of the 
major criticisms of UCITA was the broad autonomy it granted parties 
in choosing both a forum and the governing substantive law.87  
Parties could choose a forum adopting UCITA and then use this 
permissive choice-of-law provision to ensure the application of 
UCITA to their transaction—even if the transaction had no other 
relationship to a state adopting UCITA.88  In choosing UCITA, parties 
could also “opt-in” to UCITA in a mixed contract involving both 
goods and software, thus potentially substituting provisions of UCITA 
for Article 2 of the U.C.C.89  With the newly expanded party 
 80 Myers, supra note 77, at 275–76; Maggs, supra note 77, at 620; see also NCCUSL, 
A Few Facts About the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, http:// 
www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2005). 
 81 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 82 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). 
 83 Maggs, supra note 77, at 620; Murray, supra note 77, at 36–37. 
 84 See generally NCCUSL, UCITA Updates, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/ucita/ 
UCITA_Standby_Comm.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
 85 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501 to 59.1-509.2 (2001 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). 
 86 See Memorandum from Jay L. Westbrook to Members of the Am. Law Inst. Re: 
Motion to Table Article 1 Proposals (May 7, 2001), http://www.ali.org/ali/2001 
Westerbrook_M1.htm. 
 87 See supra note 79 (for critique of expanded party autonomy); see discussion 
infra note 227 (for a discussion of relevant statutory provisions). 
 88 Woodward, supra note 32, at 704–05. 
 89 Id. at 740; UCITA § 104 (2000).  Section 104, which had formerly allowed 
parties to “opt-in” to UCITA for transactions otherwise beyond its scope, has been 
removed from the current version, and now addresses new consumer protection 
provisions.  See UCITA § 104 (2002).  Interestingly, Virginia has removed the former 
“opt-in” provision from its statute and has added the new consumer protection 
provisions that replaced it.  See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.4, -501.4.1 (2001 & Supp. 
2005).  However, Maryland addressed the primacy of its consumer protection laws in 
its original statute and still retains the original “opt-in” provision.  See MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW §§ 22-104, 22-105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). 
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autonomy found in section 1-301 of the revised Article 1 of the 
U.C.C., the opponents of UCITA saw a new and more broadly 
applicable opportunity for private adoption of UCITA by commercial 
parties.90
As explained below in Parts III and IV, the effectiveness of these 
efforts in avoiding application of UCITA by opposing section 1-301 of 
the U.C.C. is questionable, and there may in fact be better ways to 
address many of the identified concerns.  However, for our purposes 
here, it is worthwhile to step back at this point and ask the broader 
question of why commercial parties might wish to choose a body of 
substantive contract law of a state or nation to which the transaction 
is not reasonably related.91
C. Choice of “Unrelated” Law—Why Does It Matter? 
Commercial parties typically form contracts in order to add 
predictability to their prospective business dealings and protect their 
intended expectations.92  The foundation of such predictability is the 
substantive law that governs the parties’ transaction.93  Unfortunately, 
the choice-of-law principles used to decide governing contract law are 
not at all uniform94 and are often anything but predictable.  Dean 
Prosser’s oft quoted remarks arguably remain as true today as when 
he made them: “[t]he realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, 
filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but 
eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a 
strange and incomprehensible jargon.  The ordinary court or lawyer 
is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.” 95  Thus, the most 
 90 Woodward, supra note 32, at 712, 740–41. 
 91 At least one scholar argued that parties should be allowed to contract around 
even fundamental rules in certain circumstances in order to avoid the application of 
inefficient mandatory rules.  See generally Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in 
Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003).  While this Article finds support 
from Professor Ribstein in many respects, it focuses instead on practical reasons for 
affirmative choices of a given broad body of law and does not presume that the 
parties will know at the time of contracting that they wish to avoid any particular 
mandatory rule or violate any particular fundamental public policy of any relevant 
state.  See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
 92 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2; Patchel, supra note 50, at 118–19; NYGH, 
supra note 38, at 2–3. 
 93 See Ribstein, supra note 91, at 403 (explaining that parties would not be able to 
use optimal contract terms without knowing at the time of contracting what 
substantive law would govern their transaction). 
 94 Woodward, supra note 32, at 703. 
 95 See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial Code, 
62 LA. L. REV. 1097, 1133–34 (2002) (explaining that conflicts laws are notoriously 
vague, often making it impossible to say in advance of litigation which state’s law will 
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carefully crafted agreement may be an exercise in futility, unless one 
can satisfactorily predict or choose the substantive law that will 
govern that agreement.96  With international commercial agreements, 
the number of possible legal regimes governing any transaction, and 
the resulting unpredictability, is even greater.97
The obvious answer to this dilemma is to allow the parties to 
specify the governing substantive law within the agreement itself.98  
However, current domestic choice-of-law rules generally favor a 
requirement “that the chosen law bear a relationship of some 
significance to the transaction.”99  The Restatement also provides for 
enforcement of the parties’ chosen law if the parties have a 
“reasonable basis” for their choice.100  However, this test has received 
only mixed support by courts,101 and the use of such an amorphous 
standard does little to enhance predictability102—the parties’ likely 
purpose in choosing their own governing law in the first place. 
apply (citing William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 
(1953))). 
 96 One might reasonably ask whether this is really a significant issue under 
domestic law in view of the near uniform adoption to date of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  However, U.C.C. Article 2 governs only transactions in goods.  
U.C.C. § 2-102.  The greater body of contract law is governed by largely non-uniform 
state law.  Woodward, supra note 32, at 745.  UCITA, the other notable attempt at 
uniform law, has obviously been a failure to date.  See supra Part II.B. 
 97 See Mel Kenny, Globalization, Interlegality and Europeanized Contract Law, 21 PENN 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 569, 570 (2003). 
 98 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.1; see also David Hricik, Infinite Combinations: 
Whether the Duty of Competency Requires Lawyers to Include Choice of Law Clauses in 
Contracts They Draft for Their Clients, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 241, 243–
44 (2004) (suggesting that express provisions choosing substantive contract law will 
ultimately increase certainty and reduce dispute resolution costs). 
 99 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.6; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971); U.C.C. § 1-105 (superseded 2001); see also Ribstein, supra 
note 91, at 374–79 (providing empirical data in support of this position). 
 100 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).  In effect, the Restatement requires only a reasonable basis.  
However, a choice of the law of a jurisdiction with a substantial relationship to the 
transaction will always have a reasonable basis.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) cmt. f (1971). 
 101 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.9; Gina M. McGuiness, Comment, The Rome 
Convention: The Contracting Parties’ Choice, 1 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 127, 163–64 (2000). 
 102 For example, courts are quite inconsistent in deciding whether the state of 
incorporation of one of the parties provides a “reasonable basis” to support the 
parties’ express choice of law.  Some courts have found that the state of 
incorporation alone is not enough to find a “reasonable basis” for application of a 
choice-of-law provision.  See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 
1994) (finding that incorporation alone was insufficient and reasoning that 
“[b]usinesses incorporate in Delaware in order to take advantage of that state’s 
corporation law, and its judicial expertise concerning corporate governance, rather 
than to conduct business there”); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224, 
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At first blush, it may seem quite reasonable to limit parties’ 
choice of substantive law based on the reasonable relationship test, as 
contained in former section 1-105 of the U.C.C.  After all, this would 
likely allow the parties to choose from any jurisdiction in which one 
or both are located, the transaction is negotiated, formed, or 
performed, or in some other fashion reasonably related to the 
transaction itself.103  However, there are a variety of affirmative104 
reasons why reasonable commercial actors might want to make other 
choices—even choices that go beyond the broader autonomous 
choices allowed under revised section 1-301. 
For example, a North Dakota seller105 of high technology 
farming equipment106 and farm management computer software107 
1254 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (holding that the place of incorporation of a business is not, 
by itself, sufficient). 
However, other courts found that the state of incorporation alone is sufficient to 
provide a “reasonable basis” to support the parties’ choice, and sometimes even gave 
rise to a “substantial relationship” between the transaction and the chosen law.  See, 
e.g., Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 807 (D. Minn. 1989) (holding that 
“[a] party’s incorporation in a state is a contact sufficient to allow the parties to 
choose that state’s law to govern their contract”); Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Super. Ct., 
834 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Cal. 1992) (holding that incorporation in Hong Kong provided 
for a “substantial relationship”); Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that “the mere fact that one of 
the parties to the contract is incorporated in the chosen state is sufficient to support 
a finding of ‘substantial relationship,’ and the mere fact that one of the parties 
resides in the chosen state provides a ‘reasonable basis’ for the parties’ choice of 
law”). 
 103 See U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 1 (superseded 2001). 
 104 This Article focuses on the reasons that commercial parties might affirmatively 
choose to embrace a body of law, rather than the reasons parties might choose to 
avoid a given body or specific rule of law.  For a thorough analysis of the latter, see 
generally Ribstein, supra note 91.  While this Article makes a number of common 
observations (and often relies on Professor Ribstein’s article for support), the choice-
of-law proposed infra in Part VI differs substantially from that proposed by Professor 
Ribstein in ways that reflect our differing perspectives. 
I would not, however, suggest that the parties’ motives in choosing a particular 
body of law should matter—short of perhaps bad faith or unconscionability.  Such a 
subjective inquiry would likely undermine any certainty gained from the parties’ 
express choice.  This is precisely the problem with the “reasonable basis” 
requirement contained in the Restatement.  See supra note 102; Joost Blom, Whither 
Choice of Law?  A Look at Canada and Australia, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. 
RESOL. 211, 237–38 (2004) (discussing the difficulties in such line-drawing based on 
the parties’ motives). 
 105 In my example, I focus on the desire of a seller to choose a uniform law (e.g., 
in a price quotation).  However, a buyer seeking to choose a uniform law (e.g., in its 
purchase order) would face the same issues discussed herein. 
 106 Such high technology equipment might, of course, include significant 
computer software components, thus calling into question whether Article 2 would 
govern its sale.  Abby J. Hardwick, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code: How Will a 
Change in Scope Alter the Concept of Goods?, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 275–77 (2004). 
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might have substantial business opportunities on both sides of the 
Canadian border and might reasonably want to choose a single body 
of law applicable to all of its sales transactions.  Suppose our seller 
would like to reach customers in North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Montana, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario.  In working with its 
lawyers to draft a standard sales agreement, this seller might 
reasonably seek to apply a single body of law to the agreement, thus 
significantly enhancing the certainty and predictability of any 
interpretation and application of the agreement in the event of any 
dispute.108
This seller might also reasonably believe that its customers, as a 
whole, would be more receptive to a choice of governing law other 
than North Dakota law, the application of which might be seen as 
favoring our North Dakota seller, as compared to a buyer in another 
state or a Canadian province.  As a seller engaged in international 
commerce, our seller might also believe that its Canadian customers 
would be more receptive to a choice of an international body of law, 
such as the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(“CISG”).109
In fact, a choice of law, other than the seller’s own law, might 
well be fairer to all of the parties involved.  While it is hard to imagine 
a seller agreeing to a choice of the law of the “buyer’s jurisdiction” 
thereby subjecting the seller’s diverse interstate or international 
transactions to an unreasonable level of uncertainty, the application 
of “seller’s law” in all transactions may appear to disadvantage some 
buyers.  The availability of some neutral and perhaps mutually 
advantageous body of law may provide a reasonable alternative 
agreeable to both buyer and seller.110  However, such a neutral 
selection is impossible under the reasonable relationship test of 
 107 Such computer software would be even less likely to be governed by Article 2, 
especially if Amended Article 2 is adopted.  See U.C.C. § 2-103(k) (2001) (amended 
2003) (excluding information from the application of Article 2 of the U.C.C.). 
 108 See, e.g., Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1993) 
(holding the seller’s choice of New York law as a single body of law to govern all of its 
transactions to be supported by a “reasonable basis”).  But see infra text accompanying 
note 111 (addressing the court’s refusal to enforce the parties’ choice). 
 109 In the absence of an express choice, the CISG would apply to this sale of goods 
between parties from the United States and Canada—both CISG “Contracting 
States.”  See CISG, supra note 38, art. 1(1)(a) (applying to contracts for the sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in different Contracting States, 
absent a contrary express choice by the parties under CISG art. 6). 
 110 See Henry Mather, Choice of Law for International Sales Issues Not Resolved by the 
CISG, 20 J.L. & COM. 155, 182 (2001) (suggesting that parties from differing 
countries might want to choose the law of a neutral state, or even a-national law, such 
that each would face roughly equivalent burdens and risks). 
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section 1-105.111  If a seller wants to choose a single body of law, it has 
only one option—that of the seller’s state. 
A reasonable relationship test effectively drives both sellers and 
buyers alike to act with a “domocentric”112 bias.  If either wishes to 
engage in interstate or international business transactions under a 
single body of law, it must, necessarily, choose its own law.  This 
domocentric bias creates an inherent conflict between seller and 
buyer.  The obvious solution to the conflict is to grant buyers and 
sellers a broader range of choices.113
 111 Such a neutral choice would also be impossible under the Restatement to the 
extent it included sales between our North Dakota seller and a North Dakota buyer.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) cmt. d (1971) (limiting 
the application of section 187 to transactions in which more than one state has an 
interest); see also, e.g., Prows, 868 P.2d 809.  In Prows, after agreeing that the seller’s 
desire to have a single body of law govern all of its transactions provided a 
“reasonable basis” for the parties’ choice of New York law, the court held the choice 
“without effect,” ruling that Utah was the only state with an interest in the 
transaction.  Id. at 811 (specifically relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 187(2)(a) cmt. d).  Arguably, the court misapplied the Restatement rule to the 
Canadian seller and Utah buyer, apparently reading “state” as limited to American 
states, see id. at 809–11, but the case is nevertheless illustrative of the problem with 
the multi-state limitation under the Restatement. 
 112 I use the term “domocentric” (from the Latin “domus” or “domo” meaning 
home) here as a generic form of the term “Eurocentric,” describing a preference for 
one’s own local body of law. 
 113 One might reasonably suggest that this problem is better addressed through 
uniform law.  Indeed, broad uniform adoption of the U.C.C. reduced the effect of 
this domocentric bias in domestic interstate sales of goods over the past forty years.  
However, uniform law does not guarantee uniform interpretation by state courts.  
See, e.g., Erika E. Schinler, Trouble at the Sausage Factory: Has the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act Been Unjustly Stigmatized?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 507, 516 (2000) 
(explaining that, while “the U.C.C. provides a nearly uniform backbone, consumer 
product warranty law is not uniform; judicial interpretations of the U.C.C. vary, and 
each state’s statutory scheme reflects differing needs and policies”); see also JAMES J. 
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4 (5th ed. 2000) 
(explaining that a variety of sources of non-uniformity are making the Code’s 
conflicts rules increasingly important). 
In addition, the U.C.C. covers a limited scope of transactions.  It does not cover 
sales of services or, arguably, licensing of computer information.  The law applicable 
to licensing of computer information is particularly uncertain today, see supra Part 
II.B., and courts often struggle in deciding which law should govern a transaction 
involving both goods and services.  See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, § 1.1 (discussing the 
majority predominant purpose test, but recognizing that it does not always work well 
in mixed transactions). 
Lastly, the future prospects for continuing uniformity under Article 2 appear 
uncertain at best.  See Rasmussen, supra note 95, at 1099–1100 (suggesting that the 
U.C.C.’s focus on normative business practices and commercial reasonableness 
inevitably leads to inconsistency in judicial interpretation).  The 2003 Amendments 
to Article 2 have yet to be adopted anywhere and may encounter significant 
resistance, which in turn may lead to further lack of uniformity.  In the absence of 
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For example, our North Dakota seller might reasonably wish to 
choose the law of a jurisdiction with a greater body of case law in 
order to enhance the certainty of the content of its agreement and 
the predictability of the resolution of any dispute under the 
agreement.114  With this in mind, the seller might, for example, 
choose New York law.  Or, perhaps, our seller of farming equipment 
might prefer a body of law that is particularly well developed in 
dealing with industry contracts involving farming equipment and, 
thereby, choose the law of Minnesota.115  However, none of these 
choices would be enforceable under section 1-105 of the U.C.C. 
because any transaction between our North Dakota seller and its 
South Dakota, Montana, or Canadian buyers would have no 
relationship to New York or Minnesota. 
A seller might also reasonably wish to choose a single body of 
international law, such as the CISG, for all of its transactions—both 
domestic and international.  However, the CISG would be unavailable 
in this context to a domestic seller under either former section 1-105 
or revised section 1-301(c)(1), because the CISG is only state law with 
respect to international transactions.116  Even if two domestic parties 
expressly chose the CISG, it would not be the law of any state with a 
reasonable relationship to such a wholly domestic transaction.117  
uniform substantive law, a commercial party can only achieve a reasonable degree of 
legal certainty through ex ante choice of governing law. 
 114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) cmt. f (1971) 
(explaining that parties might reasonably choose a body of well-developed state 
law—even though their transaction bore no relationship to that state). 
 115 The Author makes no representations as to the development of Minnesota law 
in this area.  The observation is made solely for hypothetical purposes. 
 116 The United States is a signatory to the CISG, a self executing treaty.  RALPH H. 
FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1.1 (2d ed. 2002).  Thus, to 
the extent the CISG is applicable to an international transaction involving an 
American party, the CISG preempts any state enactment of U.C.C. Article 2 under 
the Supremacy Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (“[A]nd all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land . . . .”); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941); 
Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
892, 901 (2004). 
 117 Absent preemption by federal law, the relevant state statute would apply.  In 
fact, a seller might not even be able to choose the CISG as governing law in an 
international transaction, absent its default application where the other contracting 
party or parties are from CISG contracting states.  Inasmuch as the United States has 
made an Article 95 reservation, precluding the application of the CISG through 
Article 1(1)(b) when the other party is not from a contracting state, the CISG is 
arguably not the law of the United States with respect to such a transaction.  Neither 
is it the law of the non-contracting state in question.  Thus, the parties arguably may 
not choose the CISG if they choose to resolve their dispute in a jurisdiction that has 
adopted U.C.C. § 1-105.  See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 116, § 1.5 (questioning the 
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Thus, our seller would be precluded from choosing the CISG to apply 
to all of its transactions—both domestic and international—even if 
the other parties to the transaction shared precisely the same intent. 
Moreover, the same parties discussed above might also wish to 
choose some other body of law—one that is not the law of any 
country.  The provisions of the CISG are relatively brief118 and 
expressly exclude a number of legal issues that might reasonably arise 
in the resolution of a commercial dispute.119  Additionally, the CISG is 
limited to the sale of goods.  It is not clear whether, or to what extent, 
it might apply to transactions in “information” or computer software 
that might also form a part of our hypothetical sales of farm 
implement equipment.120  Further, it would not necessarily be 
suitable to govern any portion of a contract providing for services.121
A party wishing to designate a more detailed and broadly 
applicable choice of international law122 might reasonably choose the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT 
Principles”) to govern all of its transactions.123  Or another seller doing 
substantial business in Europe might wish to choose the Principles of 
effectiveness of any attempt by the parties to “opt-in” to the CISG under such 
circumstances). 
 118 See Lisa M. Ryan, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Divergent Interpretations, 4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 101–02 (1995) (explaining that 
the “CISG is an international compromise negotiated by countries with extremely 
diverse” legal backgrounds and, therefore, contains some vague and abstract 
language that can lead to inconsistent interpretation and application). 
 119 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 38, art. 3 (excluding sales of goods in which the labor 
or service element predominates); id., art. 4(a) (excluding all questions of “validity”). 
 120 For example, such equipment might include computer software related to its 
operation. 
 121 For example, our hypothetical sale of farm implement equipment might also 
include a substantial service component. 
 122 See Sunil R. Harjani, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
in United States Courts, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 49, 68–69 (2000) (explaining that the 
greater detail provided by the individual provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles may 
avoid the temptation of national courts to fill gaps with their own domestic law, as is 
often the case with the CISG); see also Peter A. Piliounis, The Remedies of Specific 
Performance, Price Reduction and Additional Time (Nachfrist) Under The CISG: Are These 
Worthwhile Changes or Additions to English Sales Law?, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) 
(noting that, “while the international nature is similar to the CISG, the UNIDROIT 
Principles are broader in scope and more detailed in provisions than the CISG”). 
 123 The UNIDROIT Principles specifically invite commercial parties to choose them 
as governing law by express choice in both domestic and international transactions.  
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, pmbl. cmts. 3–4.  That invitation further 
suggests that a party expressly chooses arbitration based on its greater deference to 
party autonomy in choice of governing law.  Id., pmbl. cmt. 4; see also infra Part III. 
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European Contract Law124 (“PECL”) to govern its transactions.  
However, neither the UNIDROIT Principles nor the PECL have been 
enacted by any state or country.  As a-national or supranational 
bodies of law, they would arguably be unavailable under either 
former section 1-105 or under revised section 1-301(c) in either a 
domestic or an international transaction.125
In this Part, this Article suggested an affirmative rationale by 
which parties might reasonably wish to be afforded a broader range 
of choices of governing law,126 while taking note of substantial 
opposition to such a broader range of choices.127  This leaves us with 
two distinct questions.  First, should the state allow parties to choose 
the law of any state or nation—irrespective of whether the transaction 
bears any relationship to that state or nation?  Second, should the 
state also allow parties to select their own governing contract law—
 124 PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh 
Beale eds., 2000) [hereinafter PECL].  The stated purposes of the PECL include 
express adoption by parties as a neutral set of rules “drawing on the best solutions 
offered by the laws of jurisdictions within (and sometimes outside) Europe.”  Id. at 
xxiii. 
 125 This Article focuses on choice of actual governing law rather than 
incorporation by reference to provisions that the parties might have otherwise 
included as provisions of the contract itself.  The comments to section 1-301 suggest 
that the provision allowing for “variation by agreement” contained in section 1-302 
should be sufficient to accommodate the use of a-national law such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles.  U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 2 (2001).  However, “variation by agreement” is not 
the same as choice of governing law.  While the comments to section 1-302 do not 
precisely define the difference, U.C.C. § 1-302 cmts. 1,  2 (2001), there must be some 
difference, or the limitations contained in section 1-301 are rendered a nullity. 
Variation by agreement is likely limited to matters of incorporation that could 
have been included in the parties’ agreement as express provisions—in effect, 
allowing variation of default provisions of the U.C.C., but not its statutory rules.  See 
U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2001) (suggesting that parties are allowed to waive the writing 
requirement under U.C.C. § 2-201, but cannot contractually eliminate the 
requirement); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) & cmt. c 
(1971) (explaining incorporation by reference under subsection 1 and 
distinguishing between incorporation by reference and choice of law).  Under 
section 1-302, the parties’ choice of the UNIDROIT Principles to govern their contract 
would not likely give effect to, inter alia, Article 1.2 (no writing required), Chapter 2, 
Section 2 (authority of agents), or Chapter 3 (questions of validity, generally).  See 
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 38.  Thus, the parties’ right to choose a-national 
law can make a significant difference. 
It is also interesting to consider the possibility that a country might adopt a 
previously a-national body of law as its own.  If so, then the body of law would 
become an acceptable choice under revised section 1-301 in any international 
transaction—no matter which country happened to adopt it.  This seems an odd 
result in that it grants greater deference to a completely unrelated country (one not 
even chosen by the parties) than it grants to the parties. 
 126 See supra Part II.C. 
 127 See supra Parts II.A. and II.B. 
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irrespective of whether such law has ever been enacted by any 
relevant governmental body?  Or, to put the question more broadly 
and more succinctly, what, if any, limitations should American 
domestic courts place on commercial parties’ rights to choose the 
substantive law governing their contractual relationships?  In an 
effort to answer this question, I will start by comparing party 
autonomy to choose governing contract law in domestic court 
adjudication with that provided in arbitration. 
III. EXPRESS CHOICE OF GOVERNING CONTRACT LAW  
IN DOMESTIC COURTS VERSUS ARBITRATION 
Contracting parties may choose to resolve the vast majority of 
their disputes through binding arbitration in lieu of court 
adjudication,128 and arbitrators routinely give effect to the parties’ 
express choice of law.  The parties’ choices are respected—regardless 
of whether the law has any other relationship to the transaction or 
whether the law has been adopted by any governmental body.129  In 
 128 Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of 
“Alternative Dispute Resolution”, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 894 (2004); cf. THOMAS 
E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 179–80 (2004). 
 129 While neither the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) nor the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act contain any express provision on choice of substantive law, the 
United States Supreme Court’s deference to party autonomy in Volt Information 
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University fully supports such 
respect for the parties’ choice.  489 U.S. 468, 478–79 (1989) (explaining that parties 
to arbitration are free to structure their own agreements and enforcement according 
to their terms is the principal purpose of the FAA—even if such enforcement has the 
effect of replacing the FAA with relevant state law, notwithstanding the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution).  See also generally Christopher R. Drahozal, 
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004).  But see generally Cindy G. 
Buys, The Arbitrator’s Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in Commercial Arbitration, 
79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 63 (2005) (explaining that domestic arbitrators might be 
bound to follow the same choice-of-law rules as domestic courts, but suggesting that 
such domestic arbitrators should instead follow the approach employed in 
international commercial arbitration granting a greater degree of party autonomy). 
In international commercial arbitration, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration (adopted by a variety of foreign countries and American states) expressly 
states that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such 
rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the 
dispute.”  UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 
28(1) (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].  There is no express limitation 
on this choice other than the rebuttable presumption that the parties’ choice refers 
only to substantive law and not conflict of law rules.  Id.; see also Fabrizio Marrella, 
Choice of Law in Third-Millennium Arbitrations: The Relevance of the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1137, 1154–55 (2003) 
(discussing the parties’ broad power to choose governing law under a variety of 
international arbitration rules). 
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arbitration, application of the parties’ chosen law is near absolute, 
absent a specific conflict with a particular public policy of an 
interested state, as expressed in mandatory law or other expressions 
of fundamental public policy.130  This brings us to René David’s 
observation,131 oft noted by Friedrich Juenger,132 that parties can, and 
frequently do, avoid court imposed limits on party autonomy in 
choice-of-law by simply choosing arbitration instead of court 
adjudication. 
Commercial parties choose arbitration over court adjudication 
for a variety of reasons, including speed, privacy, and cost.133  
However, another significant reason parties choose arbitration is the 
Parties may also choose their own industry-specific body or rules of law to govern 
their dispute.  For a variety of examples in which parties agree in advance to resolve 
their disputes under private, non-governmental rules, see generally Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Imminent Business 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: 
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); 
Lisa Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law: The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 
2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999); Lisa 
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through 
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (1999). 
 130 See E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57 (2000) 
(explaining the contours of the narrow, judicially developed, public policy exception 
under which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award).  In international 
commercial arbitration, a public policy exception arises under article 5(2)(b) of the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards.  United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5(2)(b), done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force with respect to the United States Dec. 29, 1970) 
[hereinafter Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention].  An arbitrator has a duty to 
render an award that is enforceable, see generally Martin Platte, An Arbitrator’s Duty to 
Render Enforceable Awards, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 307 (2003), which, in the vast majority of 
cases, depends on the application of the Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention, 
CARBONNEAU, supra note 128, at 341–43.  Thus, the arbitrator should not apply any 
governing law that would violate the public policy of a likely enforcing state in a 
manner that could render the award unenforceable under article 5(2)(b) of the 
Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention.  A similar public policy exception is found in 
articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, supra note 129. 
 131 David, supra note 45, at 212. 
 132 See, e.g., Juenger, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 45, at 1133–34; Freidrich K. 
Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, 28 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 491–92 (1995) [hereinafter Juenger, American Conflicts 
Scholarship].  The broad latitude afforded arbitrators in choosing the applicable 
substantive law has arguably made traditional conflicts analysis less relevant.  
Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract Choice of Law in the Americas, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 203 
(1997) [hereinafter Juenger, Contract Choice of Law]. 
 133 See, e.g., John H. Henn, Where Should You Litigate Your Business Dispute?  In An 
Arbitration?  Or Through the Courts?, DISP. RESOL. J. Aug.–Oct. 2004, at 34, 36–38 
(2004); CARBONNEAU, supra note 128, at 5–6. 
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arbitrators’ respect for the parties’ right to choose their own 
governing law.134  In fact, the UNIDROIT Principles specifically 
recommend that parties choosing the UNIDROIT Principles as 
governing law should also choose arbitration in view of arbitrators’ 
greater deference to party autonomy in choice-of-law.135  Thus, we 
should expect that commercial parties looking for effective dispute 
resolution might reasonably be influenced to choose arbitration over 
court adjudication based on the greater likelihood that the former 
will respect the parties’ express choice of law. 
We can now return momentarily to our hypothetical North 
Dakota seller of farming products.136  Assuming that our seller wants a 
single body of substantive law applicable to all of its transactions and 
does not want to alienate its buyers by demanding the application of 
its own North Dakota law, the seller is encouraged to choose 
arbitration where its choice of governing contract law will be 
enforced.  The seller will thereby avoid the limitations of North 
Dakota’s enactment of section 1-105 of the U.C.C. 
If by choosing arbitration, parties are in fact able to avoid 
limitations on their right to choose their own governing law in 
courts,137 then this leads to two questions.  First, is this result a 
desirable one?  Second, if this distinction between arbitrators’ and 
courts’ respect for party autonomy is not a desirable one, what should 
be done to change the result? 
 134 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look 
at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 524 (2005) (citing Bruce L. 
Benson, To Arbitrate or Litigate: That is the Question, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 91, 92 (1999)); 
Rachel Engel, Comment, Party Autonomy in International Arbitration: Where Uniformity 
Gives Way to Predictability, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 323, 327–28 (2002). 
 135 UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, pmbl. cmt. 4. 
 136 See supra Part II.C. 
 137 At this point, a reader might reasonably ask, “Why not simply restrict party 
autonomy to choose governing law in arbitration?”  Indeed, this would be one option 
if the United States Congress or Supreme Court was inclined to do so.  However, this 
is beyond the power of the states under current Supreme Court interpretations of 
the FAA.  See Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, supra note 129, at 402–06 
(explaining that federal law precludes state legislation invalidating arbitration 
agreements, but nevertheless defers to party autonomy to choose governing law).  In 
Volt, the Supreme Court effectively placed party autonomy at the top of the hierarchy 
in terms of choosing governing law in arbitration.  Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Leland Standford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (explaining the FAA’s 
“principal purpose of ensuring that private arbitration agreements are enforced 
according to their terms”). 
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A. Domestic Courts and Arbitration: Which Is More Likely To Be 
Protective of State Sovereignty? 
Opponents of increased party autonomy fear that a party or 
parties will use such autonomy to circumvent laws enacted by 
sovereign states.  However, such fear assumes that parties do not have 
an alternative avenue for exercising the level of autonomy denied by 
the courts.  If an alternative avenue is available, then court limits on 
party autonomy will be ineffective.  If that alternative avenue is even 
less protective of state sovereignty than the courts, then greater 
restriction on party autonomy in the courts may actually be 
counterproductive.138
1. From What Are Sovereign States Trying to  
Protect Parties? 
Much of the resistance to expanded party autonomy in choice-
of-law arises from the fact that many “bargains” are not based on 
equal bargaining power.139  In fact, I believe that most would agree 
with the basic notion that contracts are often the product of unequal 
bargaining power—even in non-consumer transactions.  While legal 
scholars might disagree as to what, if anything, the law should do 
about bargaining inequities in commercial transactions, few would 
argue that arbitration is likely to be more protective of the “weaker” 
party to a bargain than domestic courts.140  While some might argue 
that arbitration agreements should not be enforceable under various 
circumstances involving parties of unequal bargaining power,141 none 
would likely suggest that weaker parties are somehow better off in 
arbitration than in courts. 
 138 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 745.  Professor Woodward expressly recognizes 
this problem in arguing against choice-of-law provisions granting parties’ greater 
autonomy in courts, noting that, “by refusing to enact [a provision granting greater 
party autonomy, a] legislature may cede to the courts of other states the job of 
declaring [its] fundamental policy.”  Id.  However, one can reasonably argue that 
that job has already been ceded to arbitration panels, unless parties can be attracted 
back to courts. 
 139 See Edwards, supra note 35, at 455; see also generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, 
Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005). 
 140 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual 
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2004, at 167, 179–80 
(noting the breadth of the FAA in enforcing agreements to arbitrate—far beyond 
commercial agreements between sophisticated commercial parties—and suggesting 
legislative action to limit arbitration in certain circumstances). 
 141 See, e.g., Amy L. Ray, When Employers Litigate to Arbitrate: New Standards of 
Enforcement for Employer Mandated Arbitration Agreements, 51 SMU L. REV. 441, 465–66 
(1998) (noting arguments against enforcement of arbitration agreements in an 
employment context). 
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For example, if we return to our earlier discussion of the critique 
of expanded party autonomy based on a fear that certain commercial 
parties will choose UCITA as governing law in their form contracts of 
adhesion,142 we can see that these same parties can easily get around 
any limitation under the U.C.C.143 by simply adding arbitration 
provisions to their contracts, along with a provision choosing UCITA 
as substantive law.  In fact, with an arbitration provision, the parties 
need not even designate Virginia or Maryland law—they can simply 
designate UCITA directly. 
Concerns over abuse of party autonomy are not, however, 
limited to transactions in which a stronger party may try to take 
advantage of a weaker one.  Two parties may both wish to avoid the 
law of a particular state and thereby choose an alternative body of 
law.  This issue is particularly likely to arise in circumstances in which 
the law at issue is designed to protect non-parties to the transaction.144  
Again, the relevant question at this point is whether one believes that 
a panel of arbitrators is more likely than a court to protect the 
fundamental public policy of a particular state enacting such laws to 
benefit its citizenry at large. 
Inasmuch as arbitration allows parties to avoid many of the 
limitations on their right to choose governing law in court 
adjudication, parties are further encouraged to use arbitration and 
discouraged from using courts to resolve commercial disputes.  Thus, 
limitations on choice-of-law may provide little, if any, protection to 
parties trying to avoid the previously agreed upon law; those parties 
simply end up in arbitration instead of the courts, but still under 
their expressly chosen substantive law. 
Another concern expressed by opponents of greater party 
autonomy in choice-of-law is that of form contracts of adhesion.  In 
the real world of form contracts, actual assent is often more 
 142 See supra Part II.B. 
 143 This assumes, of course, that the U.C.C. and its choice-of-law contained in 
Article 1 would apply—an assumption that is open to question.  See discussion and 
sources cited infra note 238. 
 144 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 n.19 (1985) (explaining that a choice of law and forum by the parties effectively 
waiving antitrust remedies would be ineffective as against public policy); see also Erin 
Ann O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of 
Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1583 (2000) (explaining that costs based on the interests 
of third parties or the public at large are often externalized by the parties to a 
transaction, such that state regulation is required in order to protect these interests).  
But see Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 260–61 (1993) 
(suggesting that third parties can protect themselves, as long as transaction costs are 
low). 
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theoretical than real.145  In the absence of “dickered terms” or some 
other indication of actual bargaining, opponents argue that it is 
unfairly surprising to subject a party to a form contract to the law of a 
state that bears no relation to the transaction.146  Again, however, 
arbitration provisions in form contracts are routinely enforced, 
including any choice-of-law provisions.147  Thus, unless the United 
States Supreme Court or the United States Congress decides to 
reverse a solid trend favoring enforcement of arbitration provisions, 
the form contracts argument serves little value.  Again, parties 
seeking autonomy in choice-of-law are simply driven to arbitration. 
To the extent that limitations on choice-of-law are intended to 
protect the weaker party to a bargain, they appear instead only to 
drive more parties to arbitration.  In arbitration, the weaker party is 
no better protected than in the courts—and perhaps receives even 
less protection.  It would therefore appear that both parties to a 
bargain might be better protected if both courts and arbitrators 
consistently applied a uniform theory. 
2. Respect for State Sovereignty and Party Protection 
Consistent With Both Arbitration and Court 
Adjudication 
The most obvious method to protect the weaker party to a 
transaction and give effect to certain expressions of state sovereignty 
is through the enactment of certain mandatory state laws.  Such 
mandatory laws or other expressions of fundamental public policy148 
may limit the effectiveness of choice-of-law provisions in both 
arbitration149 and court adjudication.150  For example, parties to 
 145 See William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. 
REV. 971, 986–95.  But see generally Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002). 
 146 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 741–42 (suggesting that a party to a small- to 
medium-sized transaction will rarely, if ever, understand the significance of a choice-
of-law provision); see also William J. Woodward, Jr., “Sale” of Law and Forum and the 
Widening Gulf Between “Consumer” and “Nonconsumer” Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 243, 244 (1997) (noting the distinction between boilerplate and dickered terms 
(citing K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (1939))). 
 147 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 148 European and international conflicts law often distinguishes between 
“mandatory” rules of law and rules of law that violate a “public policy.”  SCOLES ET AL., 
supra note 26, § 18.4(3).  However, American law does not typically employ that 
distinction.  Id.  Generally, a mandatory rule is one that must, affirmatively, be 
applied, whereas a fundamental public policy violation may serve to preclude the 
application of a rule.  Patchel, supra note 50, at 140–41. 
 149 See discussion and sources cited supra note 130. 
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commercial transactions governed by the Code might well be 
precluded from choosing a body of law that encouraged bad faith 
behavior, inasmuch as the requirement of “good faith” is sufficiently 
fundamental that it might well trump the parties’ contrary express 
choice in either arbitration or litigation.151  The parties’ express 
choice of UCITA, or Virginia’s statutory enactment of UCITA, might 
also be ineffective if the transaction is sufficiently related to one of 
the states that have enacted what has become known as a UCITA 
“bomb shelter.”152  Such laws, which have been enacted by a number 
of states, specifically bar application of UCITA to the citizens of the 
enacting state.153
However, a law is not mandatory, nor a public policy 
fundamental, simply because it would lead to a different result than 
the law chosen by the parties.154  For example, the requirement of a 
writing to satisfy the statute of frauds in section 2-201 of the U.C.C. 
would not likely trump the parties’ express choice of a body of law 
that did not require such a writing.155  Admittedly, it is sometimes 
 150 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971); SCOLES ET 
AL., supra note 26, § 18.12. 
 151 See U.C.C. §§ 1-302, 1-304 (2001). 
 152 As a result of the substantial controversy surrounding UCITA, some states 
enacted so-called “bomb shelter” legislation, declaring any choice-of-law or choice-of-
forum provision invoking the application of UCITA to be void and unenforceable as 
against public policy.  KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 1.01[1][b] 
(2004). 
 153 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 554D.104 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2001 & Supp. 
2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2463a (Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-15 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2005). 
 154 Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 921, 935 (1998).  For example, if all forum law were deemed to rise to the 
level of fundamental public policy of the forum state, then conflicts analysis would be 
irrelevant, as forum law would always apply.  Id.  Instead, a fundamental public policy 
should be construed narrowly and should only trump the parties’ express choice 
when the chosen law “would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some 
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common 
weal.”  Id. (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) 
(Cardozo, J.)). 
 155 For example, the CISG dispenses with any writing requirement and provides 
for the enforcement of oral agreements.  CISG, supra note 38, art. 11; see also John C. 
Duncan, Jr., Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Considering Time 
Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in 
Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1363, 1373–74 (noting various 
differences between the U.C.C. and CISG, including the statute of frauds in the 
former and absence of any writing requirement in the latter).  Inasmuch as the 
United States could have avoided the application of Article 11 through an express 
reservation under Article 96 (Russia, for example, did so based on a fundamental 
public policy favoring enforcement of only written agreements), but did not, FOLSOM 
ET AL., supra note 116, § 1.9, it would be hard to argue that any requirement of a 
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difficult to draw a precise delineation between laws sufficiently 
mandatory or public policies sufficiently fundamental to trump the 
parties’ express choice and those having no effect in the face of such 
choice.156  However, it seems a worthwhile endeavor when one 
considers the alternatives of either unlimited party autonomy or 
seemingly arbitrary limits imposed by a reasonable relationship test.157  
My intent here is simply to point out the commonality between both 
arbitration and court adjudication, in that party choice of governing 
law in each may be subject to what I will generally refer to as a 
fundamental public policy exception. 
Thus, it would seem that limitations on party autonomy, either 
through the use of a reasonable relationship test or by limiting 
parties to laws enacted by a sovereign, do little to protect state 
sovereignty or the parties the state seeks to protect.  Further, such 
limitations are more likely to have the effect of making arbitration 
the more desirable method of dispute resolution.  Instead, 
mandatory state laws as expressions of fundamental public policy 
would appear to have a more effective reach, limiting inappropriate 
choices-of-law in both courts and arbitration proceedings. 
3. Why Would Courts Be Any More Protective of State 
Sovereignty and Associated Party Protections? 
If courts allowed parties the same broad autonomy they enjoy in 
arbitration, then one might reasonably ask whether courts are any 
more likely to be protective of state sovereignty than arbitrators.  Or, 
phrased more directly, have we simply engaged in a race to the 
bottom?  For at least two reasons, courts are in a better position to 
protect state sovereignty and can do so in ways that will not 
necessarily drive parties desiring autonomy in choice-of-law away 
from court adjudication. 
First, courts are more likely to grant an appropriate level of 
deference to the public policies of other jurisdictions based on the 
notion of comity.  While often raised in an international context,158 
signed writing represents a fundamental public policy under an American state law.  
See also Woodward, supra note 32, at 735 (acknowledging that a formality, such as a 
statute of frauds requirement, would not likely be deemed sufficiently fundamental 
to overcome the parties’ express choice of contrary law). 
 156 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 735 (expressing concern over the effectiveness 
of any fundamental public policy exception based on the need to very narrowly 
circumscribe its application). 
 157 For further discussion of the precise contours of an appropriate fundamental 
public policy exception, see infra Part VI.B.1. 
 158 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 752–53. 
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the underlying concept is the same and may apply equally as between 
individual states of the Union.159  Each state court understands that its 
own respect for the law of other states may effect the future decisions 
of the courts of those states.160  This motivation to exercise comity is 
likely greatest with a uniform approach to choice-of-law, which 
arguably best serves systemic interests of all states as a group.161  
Arbitrators, on the other hand, have no affiliation with a particular 
sovereign and would, therefore, seem to have less reason to exercise 
comity. 
While the application of any exception to party autonomy may 
undermine certainty to some degree, a narrowly tailored public 
policy exception, administered with a reasonable dose of comity, 
would seem to cost the parties very little in the way of certainty, while 
offering the states an opportunity to preserve the most important 
elements of sovereignty with respect to commercial agreements. 
Second, there are additional safeguards against the abuse of 
party autonomy in choice of governing law that arbitrators are not 
likely to adopt, but that parties are less likely to find objectionable 
than current limitations.  A few simple formalities can go a long way 
towards ensuring actual assent and reducing unfair surprise, and 
parties acting in good faith are not likely to object to such safeguards, 
as long as they are not unreasonably burdensome.  These safeguards 
are discussed further in Part VI.162
Assuming that courts might be at least marginally more 
protective of state sovereignty than arbitrators, we must next ask 
whether state courts want to compete to regain some of those cases 
currently lost to arbitration.  After all, these are entirely different 
types of institutions, with sometimes entirely different agendas. 
C. Domestic Courts Versus Arbitration—Do Domestic Courts Want to 
Compete With Arbitrators for Commercial Disputes? 
As an initial matter, it should be noted that courts may be much 
less deferential to party autonomy in choice of governing law because 
courts are public rather than private institutions.  In fact, one reason 
 159 See 81A C.J.S. States § 57 (2004). 
 160 See Ribstein, supra note 91, at 436–37 (explaining the reciprocal nature of state 
court choice-of-law decisions); see also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 17 (1998) 
(discussing the application of comity by a Texas court based on notions of reciprocity 
(citing K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. 1994))). 
 161 Patchel, supra note 50, at 127–28.  See infra Part VI.A for further discussion of 
the need for uniformity in choice-of-law and the role of comity in maximizing the 
value of such uniform law. 
 162 See infra Part VI.B. 
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that arbitrators respect party autonomy is because arbitrators are 
private actors competing for dispute resolution business.163  
Presumably, parties choosing substantive law at the time of their 
agreement will also want to choose a dispute resolution body that will 
respect that choice.164  Thus, the greater the deference to party 
autonomy by arbitrators, the more likely that arbitrators will get 
parties’ future business. 
At first blush, one might reasonably suggest that states have a 
contrary interest—clearing court dockets and reducing the public tax 
burden—and that interest might be advanced by refusing to respect 
the parties’ choice of law outside of certain limits.165  However, others 
have observed that the trend towards arbitration has indeed had 
numerous adverse effects on state courts and state law.166
The trend towards arbitration of commercial disputes has led to 
a significant reduction in the number of published opinions, thus 
retarding the development of the common law.167  Arbitrators rarely 
publish opinions,168 and arbitration is not typically subject to 
appellate review for errors of law.169  Thus, published appellate 
judicial opinions, the staple of common law development, are lost in 
the process.170  Without such opinions, the law is no longer able to 
meet evolving commercial norms.171
Appellate judicial opinions also provide commercial parties with 
valuable guidance as to likely resolution of common commercial legal 
 163 Ribstein, supra note 91, at 423; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: 
Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1282 (2000) (noting an 
arbitrator’s strong incentive to honor the parties’ choices—perhaps even to the 
extent of ignoring contrary mandatory rules); Drahozal, Contracting Out of National 
Law, supra note 134, at 524. 
 164 See supra Part III.A. 
 165 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 777–78 (noting that any choice-of-law 
provision that invites litigation to an enacting state will increase the courts’ caseload 
in that state, which could, among other things, have adverse budgetary implications). 
 166 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 167–75. 
 167 Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 
(2004); Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business and Commercial 
Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183, 188 (2000). 
 168 Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 167, at 29. 
 169 Id. at 28. 
 170 Id. at 30 (noting the lack of precedential value of arbitral awards); see also 
Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators’ Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory Arbitration for 
Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 22 (2003). 
 171 Carr & Jencks, supra note 167, at 198–99 (noting the inability of the courts to 
adapt to the needs of a business community that increasingly resolves its disputes 
behind the closed door of arbitration). 
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issues.172  Without this judicial guidance function, the predictability of 
commercial law is diminished and commercial parties are faced with 
greater uncertainty in their dealings.173
The reputation of state courts and judges will also likely suffer, as 
these courts are left with few significant commercial cases with which 
to maintain a level of proficiency.  The fewer commercial cases 
handled by our state courts, the greater the trend towards other 
venues for dispute resolution, and some of our best commercial 
jurists may be lost to the courts as well.174  In at least some cases, 
judges could be lost because they miss the enjoyment of interesting 
commercial disputes and do not want to spend the vast majority of 
their time on drug cases.175  Thus, the loss of interesting commercial 
cases to arbitration likely helps to fuel the judicial exodus, including 
moves by many judges to arbitration. 
At least a few states are trying to reverse this trend and attract 
commercial dispute resolution back to the courts and away from 
arbitration.176  This phenomenon is similar in some aspects to the 
development of the Delaware Chancery Court as the preferred venue 
for corporate litigation.177  If these efforts are successful, the 
development of the state’s commercial law is enhanced, as is the 
quality of the local judiciary and practicing bar. 
However, one might argue that state courts, unlike arbitrators, 
should limit themselves to their own state law and should not be 
required to adjudicate cases under substantive law with which they 
are not familiar.178  Inasmuch as courts are often called upon to apply 
 172 Cf. Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 167, at 35. 
 173 Carr & Jencks, supra note 167, at 187 n.4. 
 174 Cf. Rex S. Heinke, The Case for Raising Judicial Salaries, 23 L.A. LAW. 10, 10 
(2001) (noting a variety of issues leading to a judicial “brain drain”). 
 175 See Joseph T. McLaughlin, A View From the Front Lines, 59 ALB. L. REV. 971, 977 
(1996) (explaining that judges are competitive creatures who hate to see many of 
their most interesting cases go off to private dispute resolution). 
 176 See, e.g., Charles E. Ramos & Alvin K. Hellerstein, A View From the Judiciary, 5 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 129, 139 (2000) (discussing the efforts of the specialized 
New York commercial courts to enhance their reputation, nationally and 
internationally, and to compete with arbitration for the resolution of sophisticated 
commercial disputes).  For a further discussion of this trend, see infra Part IV. 
 177 Id. at 138; see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the 
Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1212–15 (2001) (explaining some 
of the perceived advantages of choosing Delaware as a state of incorporation). 
Delaware also enacted a choice-of-law statute allowing parties to choose the 
commercial law of Delaware—whether or not the parties’ transaction has any 
relationship to Delaware other than the choice of its law and forum for dispute 
resolution.  See infra Part IV and note 201. 
 178 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 778. 
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the law of another state, that argument fails, at least with respect to 
domestic state laws.  However, it bears some examination with respect 
to the laws of a foreign country or a body of law adopted by no state 
or nation. 
Admittedly, arbitrators may be chosen for their specific legal 
expertise when parties have chosen a unique body of substantive law, 
and this might arguably serve as a distinction between courts and 
arbitration.  However, one of the unique things about common law 
legal systems like ours is the significant role played by the parties in 
developing the legal issues.  Unlike a civil law court, a common law 
court relies primarily on the parties to identify and apply the relevant 
law.179  The role of the court is typically to choose between the 
parties’ positions, as to which represents a more appropriate 
application of controlling law to the facts of the case.  This may or 
may not be true in arbitration. 
Thus, a common law court should not be overly burdened by 
having to apply novel law when the parties will serve to direct and 
focus that court on the relevant controlling law.  Many courts are 
faced with this task every day with the vast body of law potentially 
applicable in a court of general jurisdiction.  In fact, a court 
operating in the common law tradition would seem ideally suited to 
apply a previously unfamiliar body of commercial law, as explained 
and argued by the parties to the dispute. 
Last, but certainly not least, courts, as instruments of the state, 
have an interest in furthering state sovereignty by ensuring that the 
most fundamental policies of relevant states are given effect, 
notwithstanding any contrary law chosen by the parties.180  This may 
be accomplished directly, where a fundamental public policy of the 
forum state is sufficiently implicated by the transaction, or indirectly, 
by giving due deference to the fundamental public policy of another 
state where appropriate and, thereby, promoting a practice of comity 
between states under such circumstances.181
If one agrees that states indeed have an interest in encouraging 
commercial parties to favor court resolution of their disputes over 
arbitration, then we must next look at the possible motivations of the 
parties.  Are courts likely to be effective in competing with arbitration 
for the dispute resolution business of these parties? 
 179 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 266–
67 (2d ed. 1987). 
 180 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 181 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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C. Domestic Courts Versus Arbitration—Might Commercial Parties 
Sometimes Prefer Court Adjudication? 
As stated earlier, commercial parties choose arbitration over 
court adjudication for a variety of reasons, including speed, privacy, 
and cost.182  However, there are a number of reasons for parties to 
favor court adjudication over arbitration in many circumstances.  No 
system of dispute resolution is likely to gain the favor of all parties in 
all cases, and commercial parties will likely continue to use a broad 
variety of mechanisms to resolve their disputes.  However, a greater 
respect for party autonomy in choice of governing law might, in some 
instances, tip the balance towards court adjudication over arbitration. 
One of the potential advantages of court adjudication is cost—
traditionally thought of as an advantage of arbitration.  Today, with 
increasing discovery and other procedural complexities of 
arbitration, the parties’ costs and attorneys’ fees are often beginning 
to approach those of court adjudication.183  However, parties to 
arbitration must also pay for the chosen arbitral body,184 the 
arbitrators, and the physical setting for the arbitration, the cost of 
which is substantially greater than the fees associated with court 
adjudication.185  Thus, in many instances, the issue of cost may 
actually favor court adjudication. 
Arbitration may also lack many valuable procedures available in 
court adjudication.  For example, arbitration may not provide for 
summary adjudication available in courts, thus requiring more time 
and expense to arbitrate fully disputes that might be resolved more 
quickly on a summary basis by a court.186  Arbitration may also 
disadvantage certain parties due to limitations on discovery.187  
 182 See supra Part III.A. 
 183 Ramos & Hellerstein, supra note 176, at 135; Alleyne, supra note 170, at 30; 
Stipanowich, supra note 128, at 895. 
 184 This assumes that institutional arbitration is chosen.  If not, then presumably 
the arbitrators’ fees will be increased, as they must assume any administrative duties. 
 185 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12 & 56; Alleyne, supra note 170, at 30. 
 186 Alleyne, supra note 170, at 41–42; John Fellas, A Fair and Efficient International 
Arbitration Process, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2004, at 78, 79; Henn, supra note 133, at 
37 n.14.  But see Martha Neil, Litigation Over Arbitration: Courts Differ on Enforceability of 
Mandatory Clauses, 91 A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (Jan. 2005) (suggesting that summary 
adjudication is beginning to appear in arbitration); Elizabeth B. McCallum & Mark 
McCareins, Arbitration Procedures: The Rules of the Road in Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, at 15, 18–19 (explaining where arbitrators might find a power 
of summary adjudication not expressly addressed by the rules). 
 187 Michael M. Marick et al., Excess, Surplus Lines and Reinsurance: Recent 
Developments, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 231, 232 (1991).  While for many, such limitations 
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Extraordinary remedies, such as injunctions or specific performance, 
may only be enforced with the aid of courts, thus necessitating an 
extra step effecting such relief.188  In addition, courts are often 
involved, either pre- or post-arbitration, in deciding whether the 
arbitration agreement is enforceable in the first instance and whether 
any award is enforceable in the last.189
Arbitration awards may also be less predictable than full and 
final court adjudication, as arbitrators are sometimes prone to 
“compromise” decisions.190  Moreover, arbitration awards are not 
typically subject to appeal for simple, though perhaps determinative, 
errors of law.191  While many parties have attempted to agree 
contractually to full appellate review of any arbitration award, under a 
de novo standard on errors of law, the enforceability of such 
provisions under the Federal Arbitration Act is the subject of a 
significant split of authority.192  Without any clear idea as to how the 
are a significant advantage of arbitration, this advantage may sometimes disadvantage 
a particular party that does not have access to crucial information. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As) sumed “Consent” of Commercial Binding 
Arbitration Contracts: An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional 
Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 595 (2003); David S. Schwartz, Understanding 
Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 
U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 74–75 (2003).  This additional court litigation, which is often 
necessary, is another factor that often makes arbitration more expensive than court 
adjudication, despite its reputation to the contrary.  See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN 
HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1–46 (4th 
ed. 2004); CARBONNEAU, supra note 128, at 25 (each describing various circumstances 
in which parties to arbitration may be required to seek court assistance). 
 190 Marick et al., supra note 187, at 232; see also Stipanowich, supra note 128, at 895.  
While compromise decisions may be desirable in some cases, many commercial 
transactions are sufficiently significant to the parties involved that a compromise 
decision may be undesirable.  See Stephen P. Younger, Corporate Policies for the Use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Reduce Litigation Costs, 833 PLI/CORP. 165, 219 (1993). 
 191 See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An 
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 359 (1995).  But see 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, 
and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 429–33 (2003) 
(suggesting that arbitration awards may indeed be subject to vacateur for simple 
errors of law where the selected rules of express terms of the parties’ agreement 
support such an outcome). 
An arbitration award may be vacated for certain limited procedural infirmities, 
see 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. 2002), as well as the judicially created “manifest 
disregard of the law.” See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953).  However, 
decisions finding the latter “manifest disregard” standard satisfied are quite rare. 
 192 See generally Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do?  Expanded 
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (2004); Milana Koptsiovsky, 
Note, A Right to Contract for Judicial Review of an Arbitration Award: Does Freedom of 
Contract Apply to Arbitration Agreements?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 609 (2004). 
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United States Supreme Court will resolve this issue, parties are unable 
to count on appellate review of arbitration awards with any 
reasonable level of certainty. 
In summary, it would seem that parties may have a variety of 
reasons to favor court adjudication over arbitration in some 
circumstances and may, therefore, be quite receptive to efforts by 
courts to attract the resolution of their disputes.  While the greater 
degree of party autonomy afforded to parties by arbitrators, as 
compared to courts, is understandable in a historical context, it is 
much less clear that such a distinction is necessary or even desirable 
today.  In fact, a number of state legislatures have passed choice-of-
law statutes in which the express or implied goal has been to attract 
commercial cases to their state courts.  While these various statutes 
share some things in common, they also include a variety of key 
differences.  These commonalities and differences are explored in 
Part IV. 
IV. CURRENT DOMESTIC STATUTES GRANTING  EXPANDED PARTY 
AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF CONTRACT LAW 
Commercial parties seeking expanded party autonomy in 
choice-of-law are not limited to arbitration.  A number of states have 
enacted statutes that allow parties to choose the law governing their 
contractual relationship—irrespective of whether the transaction has 
any relationship to the law chosen, and irrespective of whether the 
transaction bears any relationship to more than one state or 
country.193  In Oregon courts, parties may even be able to choose a-
national law, such as the UNIDROIT Principles.194  To the extent that 
other states will offer greater deference to party autonomy, a state 
attempting to limit such autonomy will likely fail if parties simply 
choose to resolve their disputes in other forums.195  Other domestic 
state statutes governing choice-of-law are also instructive in 
considering a possible model statute. 
 193 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 194 See infra note 214. 
 195 A choice of governing law is presumed to be limited to substantive law and 
does not include choice-of-law provisions.  Woodward, supra note 32, at 702–03.  
Instead, the forum applies its own choice-of-law provisions, as long as it has 
jurisdiction over the parties.  Id. at 703 (acknowledging that the selection of the 
forum will determine the choice-of-law rules applied). 
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A. A Survey of Available Choice-of-Law Rules 
The most common state statute allows parties to choose forum 
law in transactions involving a specified minimum dollar amount.  
For example, California,196 Florida,197 Illinois,198 and New York199 allow 
parties to litigate commercial disputes of at least $250,000 in the 
courts of each state200 and under that state’s law—irrespective of 
whether the transaction is otherwise related to the state.  Delaware 
law allows such a choice for disputes of at least $100,000.201  Each of 
these statutes takes precedence over these states’ enactment of 
section 1-105(1) of the U.C.C. for any qualifying transaction.202  Like 
former section 1-105(1), none of these statutes include an express 
exception where the parties’ choice conflicts with the fundamental 
public policy of a relevant jurisdiction.  However, such an exception 
might reasonably be implied.203
While the aforementioned statutes are limited to choice of 
forum law, other states have choice-of-law statutes without such limits.  
 196 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2005). 
 197 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101(1) (West 2003).  The Florida statute is unique in that 
it does not apply to contracts without a reasonable relationship to Florida, unless one 
of the parties is either: (1) a Florida party; or (2) a non-U.S. party.  Id.  
§ 685.101(2)(a).  Inasmuch as a Florida party is likely to provide for a reasonable 
relationship to Florida, that statute seems to grant broad autonomy only to contracts 
involving a  foreign party and choosing Florida law. 
Ohio also has a choice-of-law statute that appears to grant broad party autonomy 
to choose Ohio law, without any dollar limit and without any reasonable relationship 
requirement, but limited to actions against foreign parties.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 2307.39 (LexisNexis 2005).  Notably, that statute appears to provide for this choice 
only “against” foreign parties and not by those same foreign parties.  Id.. 
 198 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2003). 
 199 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2001). 
 200 Each of these four states also has statutes conferring personal jurisdiction over 
the parties, based on their choice of forum law.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 
2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101(1) (West 2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 
(West 2003); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2001).  However, where 
jurisdiction is based solely on such choice, Illinois law raises the transactional 
threshold amount to $500,000, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5, and California 
raises it to $1,000,000, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5. 
 201 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2708 (1999). 
 202 While not excepting transactions covered by U.C.C. § 1-105(1), each statute 
includes an express exception for those specific U.C.C. choice-of-law provisions 
addressed by section 1-105(2).  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2005); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2708 (1999 & Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101(1) (West 
2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2003); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW  
§ 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2001).  All except Delaware also exempt transactions 
involving labor or personal, family, or household services.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5; 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101(1); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. 
LAW § 5-1401(1). 
 203 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.12. 
GRAVES FINAL.DOC 10/11/2005  9:33:37 PM 
96 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:59 
 
In transactions of at least $1,000,000, Texas courts allows parties to 
choose the law of any jurisdiction, irrespective of any reasonable 
relationship between the transaction and the chosen law.204  This 
statutory provision takes precedence over the Texas enactment of 
section 1-301 of the U.C.C. which retained the limitations of former 
section 1-105.205  The Texas statute also contains a unique provision, 
expressly precluding the application of any otherwise applicable 
fundamental public policy of another state, provided that the 
transaction bears a reasonable relationship to the chosen law.206  This is 
the only domestic choice-of-law provision, applicable to court 
adjudication or arbitration, in which parties can specifically avoid an 
otherwise applicable fundamental public policy. 
Louisiana law allows parties to choose the law of any jurisdiction, 
irrespective of any reasonable relationship between the transaction 
and the chosen law, and without any limitation as to the amount of 
the transaction.207  Parties may also choose multiple sources of law, 
applicable to various parts of their agreement.208  The Louisiana 
choice-of-law statute is, however, expressly limited to the extent that 
 204 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(c) (Vernon 2002).  These are defined as 
“qualified” transactions.  Id. § 35.51(a). 
 205 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301(c) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004–2005) (a 
non-uniform adoption of section 1-301 of the U.C.C.).  “Qualified transactions” were 
also exempted from the limitations of the state’s prior enactment of section 1-105 of 
the U.C.C.  Id. 
 206 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(b) (Vernon 2002).  This provision is 
subject to a variety of exceptions, including issues of validity or enforceability, as well 
as contracts involving real property, marriage, wills, and contrary Texas or federal 
statutes.  Id. § 35.51(b).  See also Ribstein, supra note 91, at 450–51 (proposing a 
similar approach in a model choice-of-law rule allowing parties to avoid otherwise 
applicable public policy where the transaction bears a reasonable relationship to the 
chosen law). 
In an apparent effort to add certainty with respect to any attempt by parties to 
rely on this provision, the statute also expressly defines a “reasonable relationship” to 
a chosen jurisdiction to include: (1) residency of a party in the jurisdiction; (2) a 
relevant place of business in the jurisdiction; (3) location of the subject matter of the 
transaction in the jurisdiction; (4) performance of a substantial part of a party’s 
obligations, such as delivery of payments; or (5) a substantial portion of the 
negotiations and the signing of the agreement at issue in the jurisdiction.  TEX. BUS. 
& COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(d) (Vernon 2002).  Thus, the parties can choose any state 
law and expressly avoid any otherwise applicable fundamental public policy by simply 
choosing a location for receipt of payments or negotiation and execution of the 
agreement. 
 207 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3540 (1994). 
 208 Id. art. 3540 cmt. e.  This process is known as contractual depecage.  16 AM. JUR. 
2D Conflict of Laws § 6 (2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS  
§ 187 cmt. i (1971) (recognizing the parties’ right to contractual depecage in this 
comment added in 1988). 
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such a choice would contravene the public policy of the state whose 
law would govern absent the parties’ choice.209  In contrast to other 
statutes discussed thus far, the Louisiana statute includes section  
1-105(1) of the U.C.C. in its exceptions deferring to other, more 
specific, statutes.210  The Louisiana legislature has not yet considered 
revised U.C.C. Article 1.  In view of its broad deference to party 
autonomy in its general statute governing contractual choice-of-law, it 
will be interesting to see whether the legislature decides to adopt the 
uniform version of section 1-301 of the U.C.C., with its own nod 
towards greater party autonomy. 
In 2001, Oregon enacted the most recent, and arguably the most 
modern, statutory scheme governing contractual choice-of-law.211  
The Oregon statute allows the parties to choose any “law.”212  While 
the statute appears to limit the definition of “law” to a body of rules 
“adopted by a state,” this statutory definition is written quite broadly 
in providing for a wide variety of derivations of such “law.”213  To the 
extent that the statutory definition of “law” is unclear, the comments 
state that the definition includes model rules or principles such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles214—an a-national body of law.  Like the 
Louisiana statute, the Oregon statute allows parties to choose 
multiple sources of law, applicable to various parts of their 
agreement.215
The Oregon statute also includes a public policy exception, 
expressly excepting choices by the parties requiring acts prohibited 
or prohibiting acts required by the law of the state in which such 
performance was to take place.216  Additionally, the statute excepts 
any application that would contravene an established fundamental 
policy of the law that would otherwise govern the issue in question,217 
but narrowly limits such policies to those implicating “essential public 
or societal institutions beyond the allocation of rights and obligations 
 209 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3540 & cmt. f (1994). 
 210 Id. art. 3540 cmt. a. 
 211 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 81.100–81.135 (2003). 
 212 Id. § 81.120(1). 
 213 Id. § 81.100. 
 214 James A. R. Nafziger, Oregon’s Conflicts Law Applicable to Contracts,  
38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 397, 421 (2002). 
 215 OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120(1) (2003). 
 216 Id. § 81.125(1)(a)–(b).  It seems reasonable that parties should not be able to 
use courts in one state to enforce agreements they consider illegal simply by 
choosing another state’s law. 
 217 Id. § 81.125(1)(c). 
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of parties to a contract at issue.”218  The statute further includes a 
unique provision addressing standard-form contracts.219  Not only 
must any choice-of-law provision be express, but it must also be 
“conspicuous.”220
The Oregon statute provides exceptions for a variety of specific 
types of contracts governed by Oregon law,221 as well as issues of 
capacity and consent.222  The statute also defers to any other Oregon 
statute expressly designating applicable law, including Oregon’s 
enactment of former section 1-105 of the U.C.C.223  Like Louisiana, 
Oregon recently enacted a statute granting parties a large degree of 
autonomy in contractual choice-of-law.224  Thus, its legislature may be 
more likely than others to give serious consideration to the uniform 
version of section 1-301, as part of revised Article 1. 
The domestic choice-of-law statutes granting parties the most 
autonomy in choice of law within their scope are the Maryland225 and 
Virginia226 enactments of UCITA.  These statutes each grant the 
parties complete autonomy to choose any body of law, irrespective of 
any relationship to the transaction and irrespective of whether such 
law has ever been adopted by any government.227  The only 
restrictions relate to consumer transactions.228  While the application 
of the Virginia statute is generally limited to the elements of the 
transaction expressly within its scope,229 the Maryland statute is 
subject to much broader application based on its “opt-in” provisions 
 218 Id. § 81.125. 
 219 Id. § 81.120(2). 
 220 Id. 
 221 OR. REV. STAT. § 81.105 (2003). 
 222 Id. §§ 81.112, 81.115. 
 223 Id. § 81.102; see also Nafziger, supra note 214, at 419, Annex III (listing various 
specific unaffected Oregon statutes, including Oregon’s enactment of U.C.C.  
§ 1-105). 
 224 OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120(1) (2003). 
 225 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). 
 226 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 227 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-109(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 59.1-501.9(a) (2001 & Supp. 2005).  Curiously, the Virginia statute includes a very 
simple approach to choice-of-law in the absence of an express choice by the parties.  
It chooses Virginia law, in effect, turning any selection of a Virginia forum into a 
dispositive choice of Virginia law.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.9(b).  By comparison, 
both UCITA and the Maryland statute provide for a more complex analysis, 
including an examination of the jurisdiction to which the transaction is most 
significantly related.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-109(b); UCITA § 109(b) 
(2002). 
 228 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-105(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 59.1-501.9(a) (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 229 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.3 (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
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applicable to mixed transactions.230  Under Maryland law, parties can 
expressly choose UCITA as the law governing the entirety of any 
transaction, as long as any material part of the transaction is within its 
scope.231
Neither the Virginia statute nor the Maryland statute includes a 
fundamental policy exception tied specifically to its choice-of-law 
provision.  Each statute does include a provision granting a court the 
discretion to refuse to enforce any contract term that “violates a 
fundamental public policy.”232  However, the provision addresses 
contract terms, generally, and does not, under any circumstances, 
require a court to defer to such public policy.233  It is not at all clear 
whether, or under what circumstances, this provision might provide a 
basis for a court to defer to a body of governing law other than that 
chosen by the parties.234
B. Forum Selections Based on Available Choice-of-Law Rules 
Having explored a number of these domestic choice-of-law 
statutes granting various degrees of party autonomy to choose 
governing law in courts, without limitations based on any “reasonable 
relationship” or “reasonable basis” test, we can again return to our 
hypothetical North Dakota seller of farm products to show the effect.  
If the transaction is sufficiently large, and the seller also selects its 
forum for dispute resolution in the courts of the state whose law is 
chosen, its choice of California, Delaware, Illinois, or New York law 
will be effective.235  Or, if the transaction was even larger, our seller 
could choose a forum in Texas courts and choose the law of any 
jurisdiction as governing law.236
Our seller’s ability to choose law in smaller transactions is 
somewhat more limited, but nevertheless available in a variety of 
 230 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-104 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). 
 231 Id.  
 232 Id. § 22-105(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.5(b) (2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 233 See sources cited supra note 232.  The comments to the UCITA cite only the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) in support of the provision.  A citation to 
section 187(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), which expressly 
addresses a fundamental public policy exception to party autonomy in choice-of-law, 
is conspicuously absent.  UCITA § 105 cmt. 3 (2002). 
 234 This is a particularly important question in view of the number of states that 
have enacted UCITA “bomb shelters” in an effort to avoid its application to their 
citizens.  See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 235 See discussion and sources cited supra notes 196, 198–99, 201.  Florida is 
omitted from this group based on the assumption that the transaction might not 
include either a Florida party or an alien.  See supra note 197. 
 236 See discussion and sources cited supra note 204. 
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circumstances.  The seller could choose Oregon or Louisiana courts, 
and these courts would enforce seller’s choice of law in most 
commercial contracts other than those governed by U.C.C. Article 
2.237  Or, if a material part of the transaction involved computer 
software or other items within the scope of UCITA, our seller could 
choose venue in Maryland, opt-in to UCITA’s choice-of-law 
provisions, and then choose any law it wanted to govern the entire 
transaction238—assuming of course, its buyers agreed. 
When one considers the variety of currently available statutory 
choice-of-law regimes, it becomes obvious that parties already have 
substantial autonomy to choose governing contract law in a 
significant number of domestic courts.  By restricting party autonomy 
in its own courts, a state seems to be simply abdicating its opportunity 
to develop or apply any reasonable limits to party autonomy based on 
fundamental policy exceptions.239  This broad trend towards greater 
party autonomy in choice of governing contract law is further 
exemplified by foreign and international approaches. 
V. EXPRESS CHOICE OF GOVERNING CONTRACT LAW UNDER  
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Most modern foreign choice-of-law rules for contracts and 
international commercial choice-of-law conventions at least allow 
parties to choose the substantive law of any nation (or political 
subdivision thereof).  To that extent, those conventions are largely 
consistent with section 1-301 of the U.C.C. and its approach to 
expanded commercial party autonomy.  In fact, its proponents argue 
that the revision is needed in order to “modernize” U.C.C. choice-of-
law provisions consistent with international choice-of-law rules.240  
 237 See discussion and sources cited supra notes 207, 212.  Of course, if any of the 
states currently considering revised Article 1 were to enact uniform section 1-301, see 
supra Part I, the parties’ choice of governing law in transactions otherwise within the 
scope of the U.C.C. would largely be given effect. 
 238 See supra Part II.B.  It is also worth noting here that the parties might be able to 
choose Maryland law to govern a software license in those states adopting revised 
Article 1, but retaining the language of former section 1-105.  The scope of revised 
Article 1 is limited to transactions otherwise governed by U.C.C. § 1-102 (2001).  A 
forum court might therefore consider the parties’ choice of Maryland’s enactment of 
the UCITA under the Restatement.  If so, the parties would seem to have a reasonable 
basis for their choice of Maryland’s enactment of the UCITA as a body of law written 
expressly for software licensing, thus making the choice enforceable.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971). 
 239 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 745 (recognizing this precise point while 
arguing against greater party autonomy). 
 240 See U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 2 (2001) (noting the consistency of revised section  
1-301 and various international conventions governing choice of commercial law).  
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However, some international conventions go even further than 
section 1-301, and there is substantial support for the idea that others 
should be expanded to allow the parties to choose any law—whether 
or not adopted by any nation or state.241  Thus, while we argue in this 
country over whether we should “modernize” our commercial choice-
of-law provisions, as provided in section 1-301, many other countries 
are debating the next step in party autonomy, or have already taken 
it. 
English choice-of-law would allow contracting parties to choose 
English law in English courts, whether or not the transaction had any 
connection with English law.242  Commercial parties are ordinarily 
free to choose governing law, even if unrelated to the transaction, 
under Austrian, French, or Swiss law, subject only to mandatory law, 
such as consumer or employment contracts.243  Indeed, party 
autonomy in choice of governing contract law is widely accepted 
today in European law.244  Even Chinese law grants broad autonomy 
to parties to choose governing law in international transactions.245
By contrast, party autonomy in choice of contract law has 
progressed much more slowly in Latin American countries.246  The 
legal systems of most of those countries were derived from a 
Portuguese and Spanish legal heritage based on authoritarian 
notions of state sovereignty.247  Private choice-of-law was simply 
But see Woodward, supra note 32, at 746–49 (arguing that international choice-of-law 
rules provide, at best, questionable support for broad party autonomy in domestic 
choice of law rules). 
 241 See infra notes 255, 257. 
 242 Vita Food Prods. Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.) 
(appeal taken from N.S.) (Can.); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2 n.4.  This, 
essentially, allows the same result as the California, Delaware, Illinois or New York 
statutes discussed supra Part IV.  While the United States Supreme Court has not 
spoken directly to this question, the Court provided a strong indication that it would 
follow a similar approach.  See generally M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1 (1972) (expressly deciding a choice-of-forum question, but effectively deciding 
to apply English law in the absence of any relationship between the transaction and 
England).  While the reverse—application of unrelated foreign law in English 
courts—is less clear, SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2 n.4, English law certainly 
goes further in granting party autonomy than American domestic rules requiring a 
reasonable relationship. 
 243 SCOLES, supra note 42, at § 18.2 & nn. 4, 5. 
 244 Lauro Da Gama E. Souza, Jr., The UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts and their Applicability in the Mercosur Countries, 36 REVUE JURIDIQUE 
THEMIS 375, 385 (2002). 
 245 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2 n.4.  While China admittedly restricts party 
autonomy in domestic transactions, this is hardly a model for American law. 
 246 Souza, supra note 244, at 385–86. 
 247 Id. at 382–86. 
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antithetical to such legal doctrine, so Latin American law has been 
quite slow to recognize the validity of law chosen by private parties.248  
Even where legal doctrine has evolved towards greater party 
autonomy, courts have often remained resistant.249  Nonetheless, out 
of this same Latin American legal environment has come what is 
arguably the most liberal of all international conventions in terms of 
its respect for party autonomy in choice of governing commercial law. 
The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts (the “Inter-American Convention”) was 
drafted at a conference on private international law held in Mexico 
City in 1994, which was attended by seventeen Latin American 
countries, as well as the United States and Canada.250  The Inter-
American Convention was signed by five Latin American countries 
and ratified by Mexico and Venezuela.251  Article 7 states that the 
“contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.”252  This 
unequivocal grant of party autonomy includes the right of the parties 
to choose any body of law—even a-national or supranational law, 
such as the UNIDROIT Principles.253
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (the “Rome Convention”) is less clear.  While the 
language of Article 3(1) itself appears to grant complete party 
autonomy in choice-of-law,254 most courts and scholars agree, based 
 248 Id.  Notably, those same Latin American legal systems have been much slower 
to embrace private dispute resolution through arbitration.  Id. 387–96.  This indeed 
seems consistent with their reluctance to embrace private choice of substantive law.  
The American divergence between our near complete embrace of arbitration, 
compared to our hesitance in allowing broad choice-of-law, is much more difficult to 
explain. 
 249 Id. at 382–96. 
 250 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, 
Mar. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 733 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]; see also 
Freidrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to 
International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 382 
(1994) [hereinafter Juenger, Inter-American Convention].  Professor Juenger served as 
the advisor to the U.S. delegation.  Id. at 381 n.a1. 
 251 Organization of American States, Department of Legal Affairs and Services, 
Office of Inter-American Law and Programs, B-56: Inter-American Convention on 
the Law Applicable to International Contracts, http://www.oas.org/juridico/ 
english/Sigs/b-56.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).  The United States, however, has 
never ratified or signed the Inter-American Convention.  Id. 
 252 Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, art. 7. 
 253 See Juenger, Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, at 388; Juenger, Contract 
Choice of Law, supra note 132, at 204–05.  But see Souza, supra note 244, at 396–97 
(arguing that this principle is not clear under the convention). 
 254 See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 3, June 
19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 19 I.L.M. 1492 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
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on other language within the Rome Convention, that that choice is 
limited to the law of a country or state.255  While only a minority of 
scholars believe that the Rome Convention, as currently drafted, 
would allow for choice of a-national or supranational law,256 many 
urge that the treaty be modified so as to unequivocally respect and 
enforce such choices.257
Both the Inter-American Convention and the Rome Convention 
include exceptions to party autonomy based on certain mandatory 
rules or fundamental public policies.258  However, each embraces a 
broad respect for party autonomy, generally, to choose governing 
substantive law in commercial transactions—without any requirement 
of a relationship between the transaction and the chosen law.259
The incentive to allow greater autonomy under the Rome 
Convention is particularly understandable, on one hand, in view of 
the fact that the PECL260 is not the law of any individual country and is 
not binding on EU members.  At this time, proponents of this 
attempt to promulgate a single European body of law (incorporating 
elements of both civil and common law) believe that the best 
opportunity to see its application realized may lie in express choice-
of-law provisions by parties to transactions.261  However, such choices 
would likely be unenforceable under the current Rome Convention. 
One might argue that the circumstances of PECL are uniquely 
European.  However, when one considers the failures of the last 
 255 See Juenger, Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, at 383–84.  Article 1(1) 
of the Rome Convention states that its rules govern the “choice between the laws of 
different countries,” and this wording represents a deliberate attempt to limit the 
parties’ choice to positive law.  Id.; see also Ana M. López-Rodríguez, The Revision of the 
Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations—A Crucial Role 
Within the European Contract Law Project?, 72 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 341 (2003), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/u
niversity_aarhus_en.pdf, at 8 (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
 256 See Juenger, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 45, at 1145; see also López-Rodríguez, 
supra note 255, at 8. 
 257 See, e.g., López-Rodríguez, supra note 255, at 9. 
 258 See Juenger, Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, at 383, 388.  European 
conflicts law, generally, as well as each of these conventions, distinguishes between 
mandatory rules, which must be applied in the first instance, and fundamental public 
policies, which chosen rules may not violate.  SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.4.  
However, this distinction is not important for the purposes of this Article, and any 
analysis of the distinction is, therefore, beyond its scope. 
 259 Indeed, broad party autonomy has triumphed generally in international 
commercial law.  NYGH, supra note 38, at 13–14. 
 260 See generally PECL, supra note 124. 
 261 See generally López-Rodríguez, supra note 255. 
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decade to revise Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.,262 perhaps there is 
merit in this notion of generating a body of private law to be adopted 
by parties instead of legislatures.  After all, it has been private bodies 
that have developed the U.C.C. in the first instance.263  The very 
nature of our commercial law jurisprudence in this country ought to 
make us more receptive than continental Europeans to private 
choice-of-law.  Much of the major opposition to allowing choice of a-
national or supranational law under the Treaty of Rome arises from 
the notion of positive law as solely the province of the sovereign.264  
To the extent that law is positive, the notion of private lawmaking is 
unacceptable.  Thus, the argument goes, private law making should 
be limited to, at most, private arbitration.  However, our tradition of 
commercial law making in this country is quite different. 
The U.C.C. is largely the product of private law making and, 
Llewellyn expressly intended that it focus on normative commercial 
practices rather than positive statements by the sovereign as to what 
the law ought to be.265  Much of our common law and statutory 
jurisprudence focuses on the normative nature of the “law 
merchant.”  Such normative law would seem to be much more 
amenable to modification or substitution by the parties’ own 
expressions of their chosen normative law.  Thus, one could 
reasonably argue that this country—and not Europe or Latin 
America—ought to be leading the move to greater party autonomy in 
choice-of-law, including a-national or supranational law.266
In fact, the reasons for this country lagging behind in expanding 
commercial party autonomy in choice-of-law likely have more to do 
with parochialism and nationalism than any other factors.  For most 
of the past fifty years, the U.C.C. has provided a reasonably uniform 
body of law governing interstate transactions in a country with the 
luxury of focusing much more on transactions within its own borders 
 262 See generally Speidel, supra note 38 (discussing the various travails of the Article 
2 revision process).  While Amended Article 2 was completed in 2003, not a single 
state legislature has adopted it. 
 263 See Rasmussen, supra note 95, at 1101; William J. Woodward, Jr., Private 
Legislation in the United States—How the Uniform Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. 
L. REV. 451, 453 (1999). 
 264 See discussion and sources cited supra note 255. 
 265 See WILLIAM TWINNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 302–13 
(1985). 
 266 For a discussion of the demise of legal positivism as it relates to choice of 
governing commercial law, see Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship, supra note 132, 
at 490–91.  See also Juenger, Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, at 387–88 
(suggesting that American limits on party autonomy, including those in U.C.C.  
§ 1-105, are entirely out of step with modern trends allowing for greater autonomy). 
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than most of the rest of the world.  By limiting choice-of-law 
alternatives, the U.C.C. effectively ensured that its provisions, 
including those designed to protect parties in various circumstances, 
would always be applied by courts.267  However, with the relatively 
recent expansion of both arbitration and international transactions 
conducted by American businesses, both the wisdom and 
effectiveness of this parochial approach is subject to question. 
VI. PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM MODEL LAW GOVERNING AN EXPRESS 
CHOICE-OF-LAW BY THE PARTIES TO A CONTRACT 
This final Part will address the need for uniformity in choice-of-
law, suggest reasonable limits on party autonomy, and propose a 
model statute incorporating those limits.  This Part will conclude by 
discussing the constitutionality of such a statute under the Due 
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. 
A. The Need for Uniformity in Choice-of-Law 
While various states have begun to grant parties expanded 
autonomy in choice-of-law, the effort has arguably resulted in less, 
rather than more, uniformity.  The two attempts at uniform choice-
of-law in contracts—UCITA and section 1-301 of the U.C.C.—have 
met with little success.268  While there are some discernable 
similarities in various individual state choice-of-law enactments, there 
is nothing even approximating uniformity.  This lack of uniformity 
presents a problem on at least two levels. 
First, it encourages forum shopping based on the forum’s 
conflicts law.  “Any method of choice-of-law, unless uniformly applied 
by all possible forums, will lead to forum shopping if plaintiff 
 267 Both legislatures and courts have proven to be quite hostile towards any law 
that might displace the U.C.C.—presumably, because they think it is superior to 
other law.  See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 116, § 1.5 (explaining the U.S. decision to 
opt out of Article 1(1)(b) via an Article 95 reservation as based on the idea of 
minimizing the displacement of the superior U.C.C. by the inferior CISG); Filanto v. 
Chilewich, 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (suggesting that the U.S. should 
not have agreed at all to the adoption of the CISG by referring to the efforts of the 
federal government as an attempt to “fix something that was not broken”); Michael 
Wallace Gordon, Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the CISG and 
UNIDROIT Principles as Reflected in One State’s (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School 
Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) Judges, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 361, 367 (1998) (noting the lack of knowledge of the applicability of the 
CISG, generally, amongst the practicing bar and judiciary in Florida, as well as the 
disinclination of the judiciary to apply any commercial sales law other than the 
U.C.C.). 
 268 See discussion supra Parts I, II.B. 
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attorneys are doing their jobs.”269  Depending on whether its earlier 
express choice of substantive law still looks attractive,270 a party 
commencing litigation may choose a forum that is more or less likely 
to enforce its previous choice.271  Of course, this sort of forum 
shopping undermines the very predictability the parties sought in the 
first place by expressly choosing the law governing their contract. 
The parties can attempt to contract around this problem by 
including a forum selection clause, along with their express choice-of-
law clause.  Such choice-of-forum clauses are generally enforced.272  
However, there are certainly limits273 and occasions of non-
enforcement.274  It may also be difficult to find agreement between 
the parties on a single forum at the time of contracting.  In short, 
while a choice-of-forum clause may often be desirable, parties should 
not be required to rely on forum restrictions in order to be sure a 
court will enforce their choice of governing contract law.  The better 
answer is a uniform law on the issue. 
Secondly, uniform law will help to promote comity between 
jurisdictions in recognition of fundamental public policies of other 
interested states that may be in conflict with the parties’ express 
 269 Russell J. Weintraub, Comments on the Roundtable Discussion of Choice of Law, 48 
MERCER L. REV. 871, 881 (1997). 
 270 Of course, hindsight may provide a very different view of the preferred law 
after a specific dispute has already arisen and the parties’ lawyers have evaluated the 
potential claims and defenses. 
 271 A governing law clause selecting a law other than the law of the forum is 
presumptively interpreted as choosing only substantive law governing the merits of 
any dispute between the parties.  Thus, the forum’s own conflict rules typically apply.  
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.1.  Parties generally avoid express choices of 
conflicts rules in order to avoid the problem of “renvoi.”  Marrella, supra note 129, at 
1166–67. 
 272 See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1972) (enforcing 
the parties’ freely negotiated forum selection clause). 
 273 See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on 
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 377 (1993) 
(explaining that issues of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens remain); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971) (providing that 
forum selection clauses are “given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable”). 
The level of deference to party autonomy in choice of forum varies among 
courts.  On one end of the spectrum, a court may give near absolute deference to the 
parties’ express choice of forum, whereas other courts may consider the parties’ 
choice as merely one element in a forum non conveniens analysis.  Hannah L. 
Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation: The Role of Judicial 
Discretion, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 185, 197–99 (2004). 
 274 See, e.g., Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 812–13 (Utah 1993) 
(refusing to enforce a forum selection clause because it might have required a party 
to litigate the same basic dispute against two parties in two separate forums). 
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choice.275  With the current domestic non-uniform approach to 
choice-of-law, parties can avoid any given state’s conflicts law by 
simply choosing a different forum.276  This promotes competition, 
rather than cooperation, between states.  While competition is 
healthy under many circumstances, here such competition directly 
undermines the sovereignty of other states to legislate and enforce 
certain fundamental public policies.277  As a result, neither current 
laws attempting to expand party autonomy, nor current laws trying to 
restrict it, are consistently effective. 
The best way to achieve consistent, predictable decisions with 
respect to choice of governing contract law is through a uniform 
statute.  In order to achieve that result, such a statute should grant 
broad party autonomy, while including reasonable limits on that 
autonomy.  Lastly, the statute should be applied by the forum court 
with an appropriate level of comity for other interested jurisdictions, 
inasmuch as the roles may be reversed on other occasions.  This has 
increasingly become the model under international commercial 
law,278 and it makes a worthy model for domestic state law. 
B. Reasonable Limits on Party Autonomy in Choice-of-Law 
Commercial parties long ago learned that they could select their 
own substantive law by choosing arbitration as their method of 
dispute resolution.  With the increasing deference to arbitration 
under the Federal Arbitration Act, as consistently interpreted by 
United States Supreme Court, 279 it seems extremely unlikely that the 
parties’ autonomy to choose their own law in arbitration will be 
restricted beyond the existing public policy restriction.  Trends both 
domestically and internationally also show an unmistakable direction 
in favor of greater party autonomy in choice of governing law in 
court adjudication, thus providing commercial parties with numerous 
opportunities to select judicial forums likely to give deference to the 
parties’ chosen law—irrespective of whether the transaction bears any 
relationship to the law chosen and perhaps irrespective of whether 
that law has been adopted by any governmental body. 
 275 See discussion infra Part VI.B; Patchel, supra note 50, at 127–28. 
 276 See Woodward, supra note 32, at 776–77. 
 277 See infra Part VI.B.1. 
 278 See Buxbaum, supra note 273, at 186 (noting the increasing comity and 
cooperation between various courts involved in international commercial litigation); 
see also generally Louise Ellen Teitz, Parallel Proceedings and the Guiding Hand of Comity, 
34 INT’L LAW. 545 (2000) (noting the trend towards greater comity in avoiding 
parallel proceedings); see also discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
 279 See discussion and sources cited supra note 123. 
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In the face of such a reality, it would seem counterproductive for 
a state to attempt to protect its sovereign right to legislate for the 
benefit of its citizens by refusing to follow this obvious trend allowing 
for greater party autonomy.280  Instead, both state sovereignty and the 
parties themselves are better protected by uniform choice-of-law 
statutes, consistent with the modern trend, and including a few, 
narrowly-tailored limits on party autonomy to choose governing law.  
In considering such limits, I believe that the primary practical choice-
of-law concerns can be broken down into two basic categories: (1) law 
that is contrary to a mandatory law281 or fundamental public policy of 
the jurisdiction whose substantive law would apply absent an express 
choice-of-law provision; and (2) unfair surprise in subjecting a party 
to a substantive body of law that it could not reasonably have 
expected and to which it did not knowingly assent. 
1. Fundamental Public Policy 
The first concern is one addressed in most modern choice of law 
provisions—though absent (at least expressly) in former section 1-105 
of the U.C.C. and a number of other domestic statutes governing 
contractual choice-of-law.282  The parties’ express choice of 
substantive law will not be applied by a court where that choice is 
contrary to a fundamental public policy of the jurisdiction whose law 
would apply absent the express choice.283  This concern is also 
addressed in determining the enforceability of arbitration awards.  
An award that is contrary to a relevant fundamental public policy may 
be vacated284 or otherwise rendered unenforceable.285
 280 This seems to be precisely the advice suggested by opponents of the expanded 
party autonomy represented by section 1-301 of the U.C.C.  See Greenstein, supra 
note 32, at 1177–78, 1182. 
 281 Interestingly, the UNIDROIT Principles anticipate and fully address the first 
concern: Article 1.4 expressly acknowledges that mandatory rules of the relevant 
jurisdiction will always take precedence over any contrary provision of the UNIDROIT 
Principles.  UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, art. 1.4.  The PECL have a similar 
provision.  PECL, supra note 124, art. 1:103, at 100.  Thus, there is nothing in the 
nature of a-national or supranational law that conflicts with any jurisdictions’ 
sovereign right to ensure that mandatory laws are applied to appropriate disputes. 
 282 See discussion supra Part IV.A. and note 204. 
 283 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 81.125 (2003); U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (2001); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). 
 284 See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 34(2)(b)(ii) (1985).  Generally, an award 
may be vacated only in the jurisdiction in which it is rendered.  See id. arts. 34(1), 
34(2), 6 (together limiting an action to set aside an award to the national court(s) 
designated in Article 6). 
 285 See, e.g., id. arts. 34(2)(b)(ii), 36(1)(b)(ii); Foreign Arbitral Awards 
Convention, supra note 130, art. 5.  A court may refuse to enforce an otherwise valid 
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A notable exception to such public policy based limits on party 
autonomy is contained in the Texas choice-of-law provision governing 
transactions of $1,000,000 or more.286  That statute provides, in 
certain transactions, for the avoidance of any otherwise applicable 
public policy287—an approach that is inconsistent with the idea of 
comity and the respect for state sovereignty that such comity 
promotes.  A transaction will often include substantial and 
inextricable ties to a particular jurisdiction, and, to the extent that 
the chosen law is inconsistent with fundamental public policies of 
that jurisdiction, any court or arbitral panel reviewing the transaction 
should give due deference to such policies of the relevant 
jurisdiction. 
For example, one might consider a hypothetical transaction 
based on the 1993 movie “Indecent Proposal.”  In the movie, the 
character played by Robert Redford contracts with the character 
played by Demi Moore to pay her $1,000,000 in exchange for a night 
of sex—in other words, they agree to a contract for prostitution.  
Further assume that both parties are Texas citizens and contemplate 
the performance of their agreement within that state. 
Our contracting parties dutifully consult with counsel in drawing 
up their agreement, as each wants to be certain of its enforceability in 
a Texas court of law.  The amount of the transaction would seemingly 
make it a “Qualified Transaction” under Texas choice-of-law rules,288 
thus allowing the parties significantly greater autonomy in choosing a 
foreign law that would countenance such an agreement.289  The 
parties recognize that this contract would likely violate a fundamental 
public policy of the state relating to the validity of the transaction,290 
so the Texas courts will not enforce it unless it bears a reasonable 
relationship to the chosen law.291  However, the parties are able to 
award if it is contrary to a fundamental public policy of the jurisdiction in which 
enforcement is sought.  See UNCITRAL Model Law art. 36(1)(b)(ii). 
 286 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(c) (Vernon 2003); see supra note 204 and 
accompanying text. 
 287 Id.  Professor Ribstein also advocates an approach that allows parties, in certain 
circumstances, to avoid otherwise applicable fundamental public policy.  See generally 
Ribstein, supra note 91. 
 288 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(a)(2). 
 289 The parties would simply select the law of a jurisdiction that considers 
prostitution legal. 
 290 Illegal contracts are void as a matter of public policy.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 5.1 (4th ed. 2004). 
 291 The parties’ transaction need not bear any relationship to the chosen law 
under section 35.51(c) of the Texas Business and Commercial Code.  TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 35.51(c).  However, that subsection does not include issues of validity 
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ensure that such a reasonable relationship exists under Texas law by 
simply negotiating and signing their agreement within the 
jurisdiction whose laws the parties have chosen.292  Having returned 
to Texas with their signed contract, either of the parties could 
apparently enforce it in a Texas court—despite its clear illegality 
under Texas law. 
It is of course doubtful that any Texas court would actually 
enforce such an illegal contract.293  However, this scenario, as well as 
many involving public policy violations much less far fetched, point to 
the problem of granting broad party autonomy in choice-of-law 
without an appropriately narrow exception where the parties’ choice 
would violate certain fundamental public policies of a jurisdiction 
with an appropriate connection to the transaction.  Indeed, such an 
exception is recognized even in arbitration. 
If one agrees with the propriety of a court-applied, fundamental 
public policy exception to party autonomy, there remain three 
significant decisions in defining such an exception: (1) what kinds of 
public policies are sufficiently fundamental to be given effect;294 (2) 
how should a court decide whether a particular jurisdiction’s public 
policies should be considered; 295 and (3) should the public policies of 
the forum be given effect, solely by virtue of its selection as the forum 
for dispute resolution?296  A complete analysis and conclusion with 
respect to any of these three questions is beyond the scope of this 
article.297  However, a few preliminary thoughts can be offered here. 
First, the exception should be narrowly applied in order to 
promote commercial certainty and avoid unnecessarily undermining 
and does not expressly avoid any fundamental public policy exception.  Thus, the 
parties must look to subsection (b), which does avoid public policy issues—even if 
they go to validity or enforceability—but requires a reasonable relationship between 
the transaction and the chosen law.  Id. § 35.51(b). 
 292 See id. § 35.51(d)(5). 
 293 Even though the letter of the Texas statute expressly overrides any Texas 
public policy, id. § 35.51(b), I suspect that a court might find some creative basis to 
avoid enforcement.  Perhaps a Texas court might simply decline jurisdiction (as 
opposed to accepting jurisdiction and failing to apply the parties’ chosen law) based 
on public policy concerns.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 
(1971). 
 294 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.4(2). 
 295 See id., § 18.4(1). 
 296 See id. 
 297 I expect to address all of these questions in a follow up article focused 
specifically on the appropriate scope and application of a fundamental public policy 
exception to party autonomy in choice of governing contract law. 
GRAVES FINAL.DOC 10/11/2005  9:33:37 PM 
2005] AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF COMMERCIAL LAW 111 
 
party autonomy.298  A statute might provide an express definition, as 
in the Oregon statute explaining that “an established policy is 
fundamental only if the policy reflects objectives or gives effect to 
essential public or societal institutions beyond the allocation of rights 
and obligations of parties to a contract at issue.”299  An alternative 
approach might avoid any detailed definition in the statute itself, 
leaving the matter up to common law development and principles of 
comity, but providing some degree of guidance by way of comments 
and examples.300
Second, a statute must answer the question of which 
jurisdiction’s public policies might be relevant.  In determining 
whether a particular jurisdiction’s public policies should be 
considered, the forum court might take a multilateral approach and 
decide which body of law would apply to any particular issue in 
question absent the parties’ choice, the lex causae.301  Under this 
approach, only public policies arising out of the lex causae would be 
considered in determining whether any are contrary to the parties’ 
express choice.  Alternatively, or additionally, a forum court might 
focus on the likely place or places of enforcement of any judgment.302
A third question is whether the forum, solely by virtue of its 
choice as the forum, should consider its own public policies as a basis 
to deviate from the parties’ chosen substantive law.303  One might 
 298 Fundamental public policies sufficient to overcome party autonomy are likely 
to arise most often in the context of employment or consumer contracts.  An 
appropriately narrow exception should rarely affect the parties’ choice in 
commercial transactions that do not involve consumers.  See, e.g., Michael S. Finch, 
Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on the Restatement (Second),  
24 STETSON L. REV. 653, 714 (1995) (suggesting that the public policy exception to 
choice-of-law in contracts disputes “is usually invoked by individual as distinct from 
corporate litigants”). 
 299 OR. REV. STAT. § 81.125(2) (2001); see also id. § 81.125(1)(a), (b) (precluding 
enforcement of law that would require illegal conduct). 
 300 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (2001); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 187(2)(b) cmt. g (1971). 
 301 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.10.  This is the approach taken under 
both section 187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and revised 
section 1-301 of the U.C.C. 
 302 This approach would be consistent with that applied in international 
commercial arbitration.  See discussion and sources cited supra note 130. 
 303 Neither the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, nor the revised section 1-301 
of the U.C.C. expressly provide for such an exception.  See U.C.C. § 1-301 (2001); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).  Under the 
Restatement, a court will apply the policies of the forum, qua forum, only if they relate 
to judicial administration.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. e 
(1971).  However, a forum court may look to its own public policy as a basis to 
decline jurisdiction.  Id. § 90. 
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argue that any fundamental public policy of the forum jurisdiction 
should be disregarded where the parties have chosen their own 
governing law.  The rationale for this approach would be to 
discourage forum shopping.  If forum law can trump the parties’ 
chosen law, then parties will be encouraged to seek specific forums—
having determined on an ex post basis that such forums may have 
favorable public policies—in which to litigate their claims.  On the 
other hand, a forum court might have other alternatives to 
disregarding the parties’ express choice.  A forum court could simply 
decline jurisdiction if the parties’ choice of law was repugnant to a 
fundamental public policy of the forum jurisdiction.304
2. Unfair Surprise 
The second concern—that of unfair surprise—may arise to some 
degree in all form contracts.305  However, this concern does not justify 
blanket limitations on the parties’ right to choose substantive law.  
Rather, the importance of the parties’ choice of law should be 
recognized and statutory choice-of-law provisions should include 
greater safeguards to ensure actual assent.  For example, U.C.C. 
Article 2 includes other provisions requiring that any party, to be 
bound to certain promises contained in a form contract, must 
separately sign the written provision in question.306  Other provisions 
provide express requirements for language and prominence before a 
disclaimer will be enforced.307  A combination of these two 
approaches would likely provide a better, and more effective, 
safeguard to ensure that choice-of-law provisions included in form 
contracts are the products of actual assent.  If a party cannot invoke 
the choice-of-law provision without individually signing that 
provision—a provision written in a sufficiently prominent and 
straightforward manner—then it seems quite unlikely that a party 
International conventions give consideration to a broader array of potential 
sources of public policy sufficient to overcome the parties’ choice in a commercial 
transaction.  The Rome Convention considers, in various circumstances, the public 
policies or mandatory rules of the lex causae, the forum, and other interested 
jurisdictions with a “close connection” to the transaction.  Rome Convention, supra 
note 254, arts. 3(3), 7(1), 7(2).  The Inter-American Convention gives effect to 
public policies or mandatory rules of the forum, but seems to grant a tribunal broad 
discretion in considering (or not) mandatory provisions of other states with “close 
ties.”  Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, arts. 11, 18. 
 304 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971). 
 305 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003). 
 306 See, e.g., id. § 2-205. 
 307 See, e.g., id. § 2-316. 
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would be “unfairly” surprised by the substantive law applicable to the 
transaction.308
C. Model Statute on Party Autonomy in Choice of Contract Law 
In suggesting a model choice-of-law statute, it seems appropriate 
to address commercial contracts broadly,309 rather than limiting its 
effect to those transactions within the scope of the U.C.C.  Many 
Code sections have their own specific choice-of-law provisions, and 
any choice-of-law provision should respect those as exceptions 
justified by the specific nature of the uniform laws at issue.  However, 
there seems little reason to address choice-of-law issues governing 
sales of goods310 separate and apart from other commercial sales, such 
as services and information.  In fact, a uniform choice-of-law 
provision with a scope broad enough to include all of these sales 
transactions would seem particularly beneficial in dealing with mixed 
transactions.311
A broad choice-of-law statute is also consistent with the modern 
trend favoring statutory provisions addressing choice of contract law 
broadly.312  What follows is, therefore, a proposed model choice-of-law 
statute, for enactment by American state legislatures, and fully in lieu 
of any existing provisions of former section1-105 of the U.C.C. or 
section1-301 of the revised U.C.C.  These provisions would be a part 
of an overall statutory title and chapter governing “the choice of law 
applicable to any contract, or part of a contract, except as expressly 
provided in this Chapter.” 
 308 In fact, one might argue that a similar approach should be taken to 
agreements to arbitrate in form contracts.  While such a discussion is beyond the 
scope of this Article, it might be noted that the effects of choosing arbitration over 
court adjudication are reasonably well known.  See CARBONNEAU, supra note 128, at  
5–9 (describing some of the pros and cons of each).  A choice of governing law, 
however, may give rise to a far more infinite variety of effects on the parties’ 
substantive contract rights.  As such, when included in a form contract, the choice 
should be enforced only with clear evidence of knowledge that it was being made. 
Such a requirement of a signed writing should also avoid Professor Woodward’s 
concern that a purported oral choice of governing law might avoid an otherwise 
applicable statute of frauds requirement.  See Woodward, supra note 32, at 772–73 
n.328 (expressing the aforementioned concern). 
 309 This Article remains focused on non-consumer contracts.  Depending on one’s 
view of choice-of-law in consumer contracts, they could be exempted from its scope. 
 310 Domestic sales of goods are governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C., absent an 
enforceable choice to the contrary.  U.C.C. § 2-102. 
 311 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-104, -105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003). 
 312 See supra Parts IV, V. 
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Express Choice of Law by the Parties 
(1)  Except as expressly provided in paragraph 2, 3, or 4 below, a 
contract shall be governed by the law or laws expressly chosen by 
the parties.  Any such choice may extend to the entire contract or 
to part of the contract. 
(2)  A choice-of-law provision contained in a form contract shall 
not be effective unless: 
(a)  the choice-of-law provision is clear and conspicuous; and 
(b)  the choice-of-law provision is separately signed by any 
party other than the party supplying the form. 
(3)  A choice of law by the parties shall not be effective to the 
extent its application would contravene an established 
fundamental public policy embodied in the law or laws that would 
govern the dispute in the absence of an express choice by the 
parties. 
(4)  To the extent that any of the following specify the choice-of-
law applicable to the contract, that provision governs, and 
paragraph 1 does not. 
. . . . 
The remainder of paragraph (4) would include, for example, 
those transactions governed by very specific U.C.C. provisions and 
addressed as exceptions under former section 1-105(2).  It might also 
include, for example, exclusions for consumer contracts and 
employment contracts.313
D. The Constitutionality of the Proposed Model Statute 
Critics of expanded party autonomy under the New York choice-
of-law statute,314 the Texas choice-of-law statute,315 and, most recently, 
 313 This Article takes no position as to the propriety of such exclusions from a 
general rule granting broad party autonomy.  However, excellent examples can be 
found in the Oregon choice-of-law statute.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 81.105(3) (2003) 
(employment contracts); id. § 81.105(4) (consumer contracts); see also id. § 81.105(2) 
(excluding entirely local construction contracts, which are presumably heavily 
regulated under local law such as building codes and licenses). 
 314 See Barry W. Rashkover, Note, Title 14, New York Choice of Law Rule for 
Contractual Disputes: Avoiding the Unreasonable Results, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 227, 227–28 
(1985) (arguing that New York’s conflict-of-law statute violates the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause (citing N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (1984))). 
 315 See Kirt O’Neill, Note, Contractual Choice of Law: The Case for a New Determination 
of Full Faith and Credit Limitations, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1021–22, 1040, 1048–50 
(1993) (acknowledging the likely validity of section 35.51 of the Texas Business and 
Commercial Code under the current articulation of the constitutional standards, but 
arguing for a more rigorous formulation of the test under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause). 
GRAVES FINAL.DOC 10/11/2005  9:33:37 PM 
2005] AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF COMMERCIAL LAW 115 
 
section 1-301 of the U.C.C.,316 have questioned the constitutionality of 
each under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Inasmuch as the statute 
proposed herein goes even further in expanding party autonomy 
than the New York statute, section 1-301, or, in some ways, the Texas 
statute, it seems prudent to address the constitutionality of the 
proposed statute. 
A forum court’s application of the parties’ choice of substantive 
contract law may raise two potential constitutional questions: (1) does 
the application of the chosen law violate the Due Process Clause;317 
and (2) does the application of the chosen law violate the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause?318  In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,319 the United 
States Supreme Court explained that the selection of a state’s 
substantive law satisfied both constitutional concerns, as long as the 
state in question had “a significant contact or significant aggregation 
of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is 
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”320  While Justice Stevens 
suggested two separate analyses for due process and full faith and 
credit,321 the majority effectively treated them as two sides of the same 
coin.322
In the case of an express choice of governing contract law by the 
parties to the agreement, the due process component appears easily 
satisfied by the express consent of each of the parties.  Having each 
expressly contracted for the application of the chosen law, it would 
be hard to imagine the application of that law to be arbitrary or 
 316 See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1162 (suggesting that section 1-301 of the 
revised U.C.C. violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
 317 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 318 Id. art. IV, § 1. 
 319 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 320 Id. at 313 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, & 
Blackmun, JJ.).  While this quotation comes from the plurality opinion, the dissent 
agreed with the plurality’s expression of the constitutional test, thus making this 
articulation a majority holding of the Court.  Id. at 332–33 (Powell, J., dissenting, 
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Hague). 
 321 Hague, 449 U.S. at 323, 326 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting a more 
detailed analysis of competing state interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
and limiting Due Process analysis to the question of whether the choice-of-law 
decision was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair). 
 322 See id. at 308; see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 n.3 (1988) 
(explaining that whether the choice-of-law analysis regarding the appropriate statute 
of limitations took place under the Due Process or Full Faith and Credit Clause 
mattered little, because each essentially covered the same ground). 
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fundamentally unfair to either party.323  This analysis would hold 
equally true in cases in which a forum court was applying the law of 
another state or country, or law not adopted by any state or country, 
inasmuch as the analysis focuses solely on the parties’ choice.  Thus, 
it is not surprising that any challenges to the constitutionality of 
greater party autonomy in choice-of-law attempt to focus on the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. 
1. A Forum Court’s Enforcement of the Parties’ Choice of 
the Substantive Law of the Forum State 
Both Professor Greenstein and Mr. Rashkover focus on the 
constitutionality of a forum court’s application of its own law,324 so 
this is a good starting point for the analysis.  Mr. Rashkover suggests 
that a forum state may never apply its own law without also 
considering the possible interests of other states.325  However, “[t]his 
assertion ignores the Hague court’s sole reliance on the sufficiency of 
the forum state’s interests and its emphatic repudiation of the 
weighing-of-interests test.”326  While Professor Greenstein does not 
directly suggest a return to the rejected “weighing-of-interests” test, 
his arguments ultimately seem to lead in the same direction as Mr. 
Rashkover’s. 
Professor Greenstein initially acknowledges Hague’s rejection of 
any balancing of competing state interests, and further acknowledges 
that, under Hague, a slight “state interest” is sufficient to apply a 
state’s chosen law.327  He then turns to Justice Stevens’s concurrence 
in Hague to suggest that the parties’ choice of a particular state’s law 
is not sufficient to satisfy Full Faith and Credit concerns.328  However, 
Professor Greenstein’s reliance on Justice Stevens’s concurrence in 
Hague appears somewhat overstated.  While correctly noting that 
Hague was a plurality opinion,329 Professor Greenstein does not 
appear to acknowledge that all of the Justices, except Stevens, agreed 
 323 Indeed, Professor Greenstein appears to agree with this point.  Greenstein, 
supra note 32, at 1173; see also O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1034–39 (explaining that 
deference to the parties’ express intent would seem to satisfy any Due Process 
concerns and, for that matter, any constitutional concerns under the unitary test 
expressed in Hague). 
 324 See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1161, 1173–74; Rashkover, supra note 314, at 
227–29 (1985). 
 325 Rashkover, supra note 314, at 244–46. 
 326 O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1043–44 (specifically addressing Mr. Rashkover’s 
analysis). 
 327 See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1171–72. 
 328 Id. at 1172, 1174–75. 
 329 Id. at 1171. 
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with the plurality’s legal standard.330  Thus, it seems somewhat less 
likely that this criticism by Justice Stevens will lead to a new 
divergence in the Court’s analysis of the Due Process and Full Faith 
and Credit Clauses, as suggested by Professor Greenstein.331  Instead, 
it seems more likely that the Court would apply the existing Hague 
test to any forum court’s application of its own law and would hold 
the parties’ express choice constitutional. 
This portion of the analysis will focus on the New York choice-of-
law statute.332  The motivation for the enactment of the New York 
statute was “to enhance the status of New York as a leading [national 
and international legal and] financial center.”333  That state interest, 
coupled with the parties’ own interest in enforcement of their 
express contract terms, would seem to provide a sufficient 
“aggregation of contacts . . . such that [the] choice of [New York] law 
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair” under Hague.334  Other 
Supreme Court precedent also lends support to the constitutionality 
of the New York statute.  The parties’ choice of a state’s law was 
deemed a significant contact for jurisdictional purposes in Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,335 and the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
the very significant interest in the world of commerce in enforcement 
of express forum selection and choice-of-law provisions in 
furtherance of predictability in commercial transactions.336  Thus, the 
New York choice-of-law statute would easily satisfy the Hague test, as 
currently articulated by the Court. 
Professor Greenstein and Mr. Rashkover each suggest that New 
York’s interest should not be deemed constitutionally significant; 
however, neither is persuasive.  Mr. Rashkover suggests that any 
benefit to the state of New York is either illusory or insufficient to 
satisfy the Full Faith and Credit Clause.337  However, the focus in 
 330 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 313, 332–33; see also discussion supra note 320. 
 331 See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1172–73. 
 332 All four of the articles addressing this issue under Hague also discuss the New 
York statute, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2001), so it seems a 
reasonable subject of analysis.  See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1165; O’Neill, supra 
note 315, at 1043–44; Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a 
Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 496 (1989); Rashkover, supra note 314, 
at 227–28. 
 333 Friedler, supra note 332, at 497 (citing R. Tierney, memorandum in Support of 
Assembly Bill 7307-A, at 2 (1983)). 
 334 Hague, 449 U.S. at 313; see also Friedler, supra note 332, at 502–03. 
 335 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985). 
 336 See Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974); Friedler, supra note 
332, at 498–99, 502–03 (discussing both Burger King and Scherk in this respect). 
 337 Rashkover, supra note 314, at 242–46. 
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Hague is on the state’s interest and not the quantification of benefits 
arising out of that interest.338  Professor Greenstein suggests that New 
York’s interest is insufficient and attempts to support his assertion by 
analogy to a couple’s choice of an unrelated state’s law to govern 
their marriage.339  However, a marriage contract is sui generis and 
hardly provides a reasonable analogy to commercial agreements.  
Moreover, Professor Greenstein’s marriage contract hypothetical 
expressly assumes that the chosen state in question has “no interest in 
regulating [the parties’] marriage.”340  This is directly contrary to New 
York’s stated interest in resolving parties’ commercial disputes under 
New York law. 
Nonetheless, Professor Greenstein attempts to rely upon this 
marriage hypothetical and Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Hague to 
suggest that other interested states also have a constitutional interest 
protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and that this other state 
interest bars the application of New York law absent some reasonable 
relationship between the transaction and the chosen New York law.341  
In essence, this is nothing more than the “weighing-of-interests” test 
expressly repudiated by the Court in Hague.  While a New York 
court’s application of New York law is almost certainly constitutional 
under the Hague standard, it may be worth briefly addressing 
Professor Greenstein’s next argument that a fundamental public 
policy exception is inadequate in protecting the interests of other 
states—if such interests were to be deemed relevant to a Full Faith 
and Credit analysis.342
 338 See Friedler, supra note 332, at 502; see also O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1043–44 
(suggesting that New York’s interest is constitutionally sufficient under Hague, 
notwithstanding Mr. Rashkover’s arguments to the contrary). 
Mr. Rashkover also argues that the parties’ interest in certainty with respect to 
governing contract law is insufficient, because the New York statute will not promote 
certainty.  Rashkover, supra note 314, at 243.  However, that argument is 
fundamentally flawed in that it relies upon uncertainty in respect for party autonomy 
absent the statute, in effect proving the need for it.  While Mr. Rashkover is correct 
that the lack of a forum selection clause may reintroduce such uncertainty, this does 
not undermine the value of a statute respecting party autonomy—it simply 
reemphasizes the need for a uniform choice-of-law statute or a forum selection 
clause. 
 339 See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1174–75. 
 340 Id. at 1175. 
 341 Id. at 1174–77. 
 342 While acknowledging that Hague does not mandate any deference to 
fundamental public policies of other interested states, Professor Friedler 
acknowledges the potential concern and then addresses it by suggesting that a New 
York court might likely supplement the New York choice-of-law statute by reference 
to the common law public policy exception.  See Friedler, supra note 332, at 511–12. 
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Here, Professor Greenstein shifts his analysis back to section  
1-301 of the U.C.C. and acknowledges that the statute includes a 
fundamental public policy exception.343  He then suggests that, where 
a forum court’s only interest in applying its own law rests solely on 
the parties’ choice, that forum court could never be relied upon to 
ascertain the fundamental public policy of another interested state in 
a matter that would satisfy the Full Faith and Credit Clause.344  The 
argument simultaneously proves both too much and too little. 
If the Full Faith and Credit Clause actually requires some sort of 
weighing of state interests when evaluating the enforceability of the 
parties’ choice of governing contract law, then this same sort of 
weighing would likely be required if the parties chose the law of a 
state to which the transaction bore a reasonable relationship.  Even if 
the transaction bore some relationship to the chosen law, another 
state might have a far greater interest based on some fundamental 
public policy of that other state.  Thus, Professor Greenstein’s analysis 
would render any application of the parties’ chosen law in the face of 
a potential interest of another state to be unconstitutional under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
In fact, the courts of one state are quite competent to evaluate 
the fundamental public policy of another state.  Both federal and 
state courts often apply the law of another state, or even another 
country, by reference to its constitution, statutes, and relevant 
precedent, including circumstances involving significant public policy 
issues.  It is simply difficult to fathom a decision interpreting the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause as requiring deference by a forum court to a 
fundamental public policy of another state, but precluding the forum 
court from deciding the issue. 
2. A Forum Court’s Enforcement of the Parties’ Choice of 
the Substantive Law of Another State or a Choice of A-
National Law 
A somewhat different question arises when the parties’ choice of 
governing contract law requires a forum court to apply the law of 
Mr. O’Neill goes even further and suggests a proposed reformulation of the 
Hague test that would require due deference to the interests of other states under a 
public policy exception.  See O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1047–50.  Mr. O’Neill’s Note 
provided a direct response to the Texas choice-of-law statute that expressly allowed 
the parties to avoid fundamental public policies of other interested states under 
certain circumstances.  See discussion supra Part VI.B.1 (discussing that aspect of the 
Texas statute). 
 343 See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1178. 
 344 Id. at 1179–81. 
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another state or to apply a-national law.  Obviously, the forum state 
cannot assert an interest in the development of its substantive law, as 
in the case of the New York statute.  Instead, its interest must rest 
entirely on the application of its own choice-of-law provisions to the 
disputes before its courts.  Thus, a statute allowing the parties to 
choose unrelated law, including a body of law other than that of the 
forum,345 might require an additional level of constitutional analysis.  
I am not aware of any prior constitutional analysis of this specific 
issue,346 so I will attempt to provide both a simple approach and a 
somewhat more complex approach. 
One might simply focus on the choice-of-law statute rather than 
the chosen governing law—particularly if a-national law is chosen.347  
If so, then the constitutional analysis is relatively straightforward.  A 
choice-of-law rule would quite likely be deemed a procedural rather 
than a substantive rule for purposes of any Full Faith and Credit 
analysis.348  The parties’ choice of governing substantive law is 
generally presumed to exclude the choice-of-law rules of the 
jurisdiction chosen.349  Instead, the forum, qua forum, employs its 
own choice-of-law rules as a procedural rule of the forum, irrespective 
of what substantive rule is ultimately chosen to govern the parties’ 
dispute.350  A state is always competent to legislate its own procedural 
rules and is never compelled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
substitute the procedural rules of another state.351  Thus, a choice-of-
 345 This would include, to varying degrees, the Oregon and Louisiana statutes, see 
supra notes 207, 212, section 1-301 of the U.C.C., and the proposed model statute. 
 346 While the issue is clearly raised by section 1-301 of the U.C.C., Professor 
Greenstein seems to have, inexplicably, focused entirely on a forum court’s 
application of its own law.  See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1161, 1173–74. 
 347 Presumably, no state would have any interest in the application of such  
a-national law. 
 348 While a state’s choice-of-law rules are considered substantive under an Erie 
analysis, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (citing Erie 
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)), there is no relationship between the 
substantive/procedural dichotomy under Erie and the substantive/procedural 
dichotomy under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 
717, 726–27 (1988). 
 349 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.1. 
 350 Id. § 3.1. 
 351 Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 722.  Moreover, the Report accompanying the legislative 
introduction of the Oregon statute contains a thorough discussion of both the 
impetus and objectives of the new statute.  See generally Nafziger, supra note 214.  
After discussing the pre-existing unsatisfactory state of then-existing conflicts law in 
Oregon, the Report expressly specifies the objectives of the statute “to establish 
concrete, stable rules to resolve issues transcending jurisdictional boundaries.”  Id. at 
407.  The Report further explains that “[t]he proposed bill manifests the objectives 
of conflicts justice and material or substantive justice by setting for both a detailed set 
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law rule granting broad party autonomy should, itself, easily satisfy 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
The more challenging issue arises if we attempt to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the application of the chosen law.352  Suppose, for 
example, that the parties chose the law of a jurisdiction without any 
relationship to their transaction and without any expressed state 
interest in parties choosing its law to govern their transactions.  Or, 
suppose the parties’ chose a-national law, such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles.  In either case, one might reasonably argue that no state 
has any interest in the application of the chosen law to the parties’ 
transaction, and that even the minimal Hague test requires some state 
interest, however minimal.353  However, there are two different 
approaches one might take in arguing that the application of such 
unrelated law nevertheless satisfies any Full Faith and Credit 
concerns. 
First, one might argue that the Hague test is sufficiently unitary 
that the parties express choice is, by itself, a sufficient interest to 
satisfy any constitutional concerns—either Due Process or Full Faith 
and Credit.354  In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,355 the Court’s 
determination that the application of Kansas law to certain out-of-
state gas interests was unconstitutional rested largely on its 
determination that “the parties had [no] idea that Kansas law would 
control” at the time of contracting.356  After stating the Hague test, the 
Court observed that “[w]hen considering fairness in this context, an 
important element is the expectation of the parties.”357  Thus, the 
parties’ express choice might, by itself, satisfy both Due Process358 and 
Full Faith and Credit under a truly unitary test. 
If, however, the Court were to determine that Full Faith and 
Credit required some state interest, notwithstanding express party 
of rules and a general rule that requires the application of the best available or most 
appropriate law, as defined by criteria of substantive justice.”  Id. at 408.  It would 
seem beyond dispute that such a state interest would satisfy any constitutional 
concerns. 
 352 It is not entirely clear to me that the Court would necessarily separate its 
analysis of the operation of the relevant choice-of-law rule and the application of the 
chosen substantive law.  However, in view of the novelty of the issue, I thought it 
worth a brief discussion. 
 353 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981). 
 354 See O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1040–42. 
 355 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 356 Id. at 822. 
 357 Id. 
 358 As discussed supra note 323, there would not appear to be any due process 
concerns where the parties’ expressly chose the substantive law in question. 
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consent to the substantive law in question, then it might reasonably 
consider an approach similar to that advocated by Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.359  In Wortman, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of the application by a Kansas court 
of its own statute of limitations to a claim governed by the substantive 
law of another state.360  A majority of the Court held the Kansas 
court’s actions constitutional by determining that the Kansas statute 
of limitations was a procedural, rather than substantive, rule for 
purposes of this analysis.361  However, Justice Brennan suggested that 
a statute of limitations had both procedural and substantive aspects 
and should be treated as such in any Full Faith and Credit analysis.362
Like a statute of limitations provision, a choice-of-law provision 
arguably has both procedural and substantive elements—particularly 
when one looks at it in combination with the substantive law chosen.  
Together, the choice-of-law provision and the chosen substantive law 
will determine the parties’ contractual rights and obligations.  As 
such, it might be reasonable to evaluate them together under Full 
Faith and Credit, which in turn might lead to a consideration of a 
forum state’s interest in enacting its choice-of-law provision, as well as 
its aggregation of contacts with the parties. 
In effect, the parties are choosing the forum to resolve their 
dispute.  Whether this choice is made in the agreement itself or after 
a dispute arises, the parties are, among other things, choosing the 
forum’s choice-of-law rules.  In adopting a law granting parties broad 
autonomy in choosing governing contract law, a state is exercising a 
legitimate interest in promoting itself as a center for resolution of 
commercial disputes by promising to respect the parties’ choice of 
governing law in an effort to add predictability and certainty to their 
transactions.363  Each party has an important self interest, and each 
party’s interest is inextricably bound to the other’s.  As such, the 
forum’s application of the parties’ chosen law—even where it is not 
 359 486 U.S. at 734–43 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting a different analytical 
approach to the Full Faith and Credit analysis of the application of the Kansas statute 
of limitations in question). 
 360 Id. at 722–23. 
 361 Id. at 727–30. 
 362 Id. at 736 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 363 The Report accompanying the legislative introduction of Oregon’s contractual 
choice-of-law statute concludes by stating that “[e]nactment of the proposed 
legislation would revive Oregon’s leadership in conflicts law . . . and would help put 
Oregon in the forefront of a trend toward codification of conflicts law.”  Nafziger, 
supra note 214, at 413, Annex I. 
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the law of the forum—should pass Constitutional muster under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the proposed model statute would allow our 
hypothetical North Dakota seller of farm products to make a business 
decision to choose the law most suitable to the seller and its buyers, 
without regard to whether any given transaction bears any 
relationship to the chosen law, and without regard to whether the 
chosen law had ever been adopted by a sovereign state or country.  
Such a choice by the parties would stand on equal footing with 
choices made in arbitration and with modern trends in choice-of-law 
applied by foreign and international courts.  The parties’ choice 
would be enforced, subject only to minimal requirements relating to 
form contracts and a narrow exception where such choice would 
contravene certain mandatory rules or violate certain fundamental 
public policies. 
 
